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ABSTRACT 
  Two hundred and twenty-five years ago, North Carolina established 
the nation’s oldest public university, choosing as its home a particularly 
inviting poplar tree in present-day Chapel Hill. Today, UNC-Chapel 
Hill is part of a sixteen-campus university system known nationwide 
for its commitment to ensuring that public universities remain 
financially accessible to the citizens who support them.  
  That commitment is codified in Article IX, Section 9 of the North 
Carolina Constitution, which requires that tuition at the State’s public 
universities be “as far as practicable . . . free of expense.” That clause 
was first introduced in North Carolina’s 1868 Constitution, nearly 
eighty years after UNC-Chapel Hill opened its doors. Before its 
imposition, higher education in North Carolina was anything but 
affordable. After ratification of the 1868 Constitution, tuition at the 
State’s public universities not only decreased, but remained at a steady, 
low-price for more than a century: $1450 in 2017 dollars, except for 
years when inflation spiked.  
  This Note argues that Article IX, Section 9 requires the General 
Assembly to fund higher education such that tuition does not exceed 
this amount, adjusted for inflation—a standard leaders in Raleigh have 
failed to meet for nearly two decades.  
  Should legislators fail to heed this constitutional mandate, students 
could successfully challenge the legislature’s refusal to adequately fund 
higher education.  
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“The General Assembly shall provide that the benefits of The 
University of North Carolina and other public institutions of 
higher education, as far as practicable, be extended to the 
people of the State free of expense.” – N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 9 
INTRODUCTION 
North Carolina’s constitutional commitment to accessible higher 
education began not in 1868, when the above-quoted text first 
appeared in the State’s constitution,1 but rather in 1776, when the State 
became the second former colony to call for support for a public 
university, and the first to call for the founding of one, in its 
constitution.2 In the 242 years since, the State has taken its 
constitutional obligation to provide affordable higher education 
seriously. When the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
(“UNC-Chapel Hill”) reopened in 1875, amid Reconstruction and 
after the ratification of the 1868 Constitution, tuition was $60,3 or 
$1374.50 in 2017 dollars.4 Between 1916 and 1995, tuition never 
exceeded $1450 in today’s dollars.5 Even during the deflation of the 
1890s and early 1900s,6 the highest cost of tuition adjusted to today’s 
 
 1. See N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, § 6, in 5 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, 
COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND 
COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2743, 2817 
(Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909) [hereinafter THORPE] (“The general assembly shall provide 
that the benefits of the university, as far as practicable, be extended to the youth of the State free 
of expense for tuition . . . .”). 
 2. See N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XLI, in 5 THORPE, supra note 1, at 2794 (“[A]ll useful 
learning shall be duly encouraged, and promoted, in one or more universities.”). 
 3. UNIV. OF N.C., CATALOGUE OF THE TRUSTEES, FACULTY AND STUDENTS OF THE 
UNIV. OF N.C., 1875-’76, at 13 (1876). 
 4. Inflation adjustments for years prior to 1913 are based on a conversion tool produced by 
the Official Data Foundation, Inflation Calculator, OFFICIAL DATA FOUND., http:// 
www.in2013dollars.com [https://perma.cc/PDZ9-8W6G], which is based from a historical study by 
Professor Robert Sahr. Id. 
 5. A spreadsheet listing each year’s tuition price—in that year’s dollars as well as in 2017 
dollars—based on the author’s independent research analyzing each year’s student handbook, 
university catalogue, or each year’s Statistical Abstract of Higher Education in North Carolina, is 
on file with Duke Law Journal and is available for reference upon request. Inflation adjustments 
for years after 1913 are based on the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistic’s Consumer Price Index. CPI 
Inflation Calculator, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_ 
calculator.htm [http://perma.cc/SRG5-AJKZ].  
 6. See Christopher J. Neely, U.S. Historical Experience with Deflation, FED. RES. BANK OF 
ST. LOUIS: ECONOMIC SYNOPSES 1 (Oct. 19, 2010), https://files.stlouisfed.org/files/htdocs/
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dollars would only be $1771,7 significantly less than the more than 
$7000 charged today.8  
Today, state leaders speak openly of North Carolina’s 
constitutional obligation to make college education accessible. 
Governor Roy Cooper campaigned on ensuring that the State fulfills 
its constitutional promise by increasing funding for universities and 
community colleges.9 Former University of North Carolina System 
(“UNC System”) President C.D. Spangler describes the provision as 
requiring that “[n]o one in our state [be] denied a college education 
because of lack of money.”10 Even John Hood, chairman of the fiscally 
conservative John Locke Foundation, views the clause as an obligation 
that the state legislature fund “a large majority of public college and 
university expenses.”11 
North Carolina has been rewarded for its commitment to 
accessible higher education. The State proudly claims to be home to 
the nation’s oldest public university,12 the nation’s first public 
university for Native Americans,13 and more of the nation’s four-year 
public historically black colleges and universities than any other state.14 
 
publications/es/10/ES1030.pdf [https://perma.cc/PJ48-VKU8] (illustrating the deflationary 
episodes in 1890, 1893, and 1907). 
 7. Between 1890 and 1916, the highest amount of tuition charged, measured in 2017 dollars 
according to Inflation Calculator, OFFICIAL DATA FOUND., supra note 4, was $1771. See UNIV. 
OF N.C., UNIV. OF N.C. CATALOGUE 1897-98, at 59 (1897) (listing tuition per semester as $30 for 
a total of $60 per academic year). 
 8. See infra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 9. See Prioritizing Our State’s Future, ROY COOPER FOR NORTH CAROLINA, 
https://www.roycooper.com/education [https://perma.cc/QKR2-FPKD] (promising to “push to 
reverse this economically disastrous trend [of cutting funding for public universities] and 
rebalance our state’s priorities,” and averring that “North Carolina must uphold its constitutional 
commitment guaranteeing post-secondary education is ‘free as far as practical’”). 
 10. Margaret Spellings, Margaret Spellings: Higher Education Is a New Civil Right, NEWS & 
REC. (Oct. 23, 2016), http://www.greensboro.com/opinion/columns/margaret-spellings-higher-
education-is-a-new-civil-right/article_12223df6-8ecb-5d8d-aba7-95ff140990fd.html [https:// 
perma.cc/B6JG-5DYX]. 
 11. John Hood, Opinion, Practicable Policy on UNC Tuition, CAROLINA J. (Feb. 15, 2011, 
12:00 AM), https://www.carolinajournal.com/opinion-article/practicable-policy-on-unc-tuition 
[https://perma.cc/2THQ-KKSN].  
 12. WILLIAM D. SNIDER, LIGHT ON THE HILL: A HISTORY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH 
CAROLINA AT CHAPEL HILL 3 (1992).  
 13. History, UNIV. OF N.C. AT PEMBROKE, http://www.uncp.edu/about-uncp/history 
[https://perma.cc/85BG-7NJ7]. 
 14. See College Navigator, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDU. STATISTICS, https://nces.ed.gov/ 
COLLEGENAVIGATOR (last visited Sept. 16, 2018) [select “Public” and “4-year” for 
“Institution Type” and “Historically Black College or University” for “Specialized Mission,” then 
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The benefits extend beyond pride; support for affordable higher 
education has paid enormous dividends for the State’s economy. Two 
of its public universities, UNC-Chapel Hill and North Carolina State 
University (“NC State”), are two of three universities whose research 
prowess attracted pharmaceutical companies to the famed Research 
Triangle Park.15 The Research Triangle Park transformed North 
Carolina, once one of the country’s poorest states, into the envy of the 
American South by attracting 250 technological and pharmaceutical 
companies, not to mention 50,000 jobs, to the State’s Piedmont 
region.16  
Then came the Great Recession of 2008, which decimated state 
revenue. Forced to balance its budget, the General Assembly made 
drastic cuts to appropriations for higher education. Since 2007, per 
pupil funding has decreased by 20 percent when adjusted for inflation.17 
To account for lost revenue, state universities have raised tuition costs. 
While tuition at North Carolina’s public universities remains low 
relative to other states,18 it has still increased nearly 75 percent in the 
past decade,19 or roughly 38 percent adjusted for inflation—a larger 
increase than was seen in thirty-seven other states.20 In 2007–2008, 
 
follow “Search”] (showing that North Carolina has five Historically Black Colleges or 
Universities, the highest among all states). 
 15. Research Triangle Park, DURHAM CONVENTION & VISITORS BUREAU, 
https://www.durham-nc.com/maps-info/districts/research-triangle-park [https://perma.cc/8RL7-
MLX3]. 
 16. About Us, RESEARCH TRIANGLE PARK, https://www.rtp.org/about-us [https:// 
perma.cc/V9LT-5TWY]. 
 17. Michael Mitchell, Michael Leachman & Kathleen Masterson, Funding Down, Tuition 
Up: State Cuts to Higher Education Threaten Quality and Affordability at Public Colleges, CTR. 
ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Aug. 15, 2016), https://www.cbpp.org/research/state-budget-
and-tax/funding-down-tuition-up [https://perma.cc/QNV2-4NK5]. 
 18. Jason Debruyn, Incoming UNC Students Likely to See Tuition Increase, WUNC (Jan. 13, 
2017), http://wunc.org/post/incoming-unc-students-likely-see-tuition-increase#stream/0 [https:// 
perma.cc/6R4R-QYCC]. 
 19. Id.  
 20. Mitchell, Leachman & Masterson, supra note 17. 
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average in-state tuition at UNC System21 institutions was $2393,22 while 
in 2017–2018 it was $4352.23 Yearly tuition at UNC-Chapel Hill is 
currently $7018—nearly three thousand dollars more than the System 
average.24 In 2014, the cost of sending a child to one of the State’s four-
year public universities amounted to between 21 and 25.7 percent of 
the average North Carolina family’s annual income.25 
Of course, North Carolina was far from the only state to impose 
cuts on state support for public higher education during the Great 
Recession of 2008. Drastic increases in the cost of tuition at public 
universities nationwide have pushed college affordability to the fore of 
public attention. Adjusted for inflation, average state spending per 
student is down 18 percent from a decade ago.26 That has likely led to 
commensurate increases in tuition.27 While Americans may have 
become accustomed to hefty price tags at private universities or out-
 
 21. What constitutes the University of North Carolina has changed over time. What is 
presently UNC-Chapel Hill was founded in 1789. 220 Years of History, U. OF N.C. SYS., 
https://www.northcarolina.edu/about-our-system/220-years-history [https://perma.cc/8TVX-
DM2Y]. In 1933, the legislature brought UNC-Chapel Hill, the Women’s College, and North 
Carolina State University under the umbrella of UNC. Id. By the late 1960s, three more state 
funded universities joined the system. Id. Finally, in 1971 the remaining ten public universities 
joined what is now known as the UNC System. Id. References to the “University” before 1933 
thus refer to UNC-Chapel Hill. After 1933, references to the “University” refer to the UNC 
System.  
 22. UNIV. OF N.C., TUITION & FEES APPLICABLE TO ALL REGULAR FULL-TIME 
UNDERGRADUATE STUDENTS 2007-08, http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/fiscalresearch/
Statistics_and_Data/statistics_and_data_pdfs/education/2007-08%20Undergraduate%20and
%20Graduate%20tuition.pdf [https://perma.cc/PT2G-B3FD]. 
 23. UNIV. OF N.C., TUITION & FEES APPLICABLE TO ALL REGULAR FULL-TIME 
UNDERGRADUATE STUDENTS 2017-18, https://www.northcarolina.edu/sites/default/files/2017-
18_ug_tuition_and_fees.pdf [https://perma.cc/3KWG-YBAW]. 
 24. UNIV. OF N.C. AT CHAPEL HILL, TUITION & FEES ACADEMIC YEAR 2017-2018, 
https://cashier.unc.edu/files/2017/07/17_18YR.pdf [https://perma.cc/HXB5-B2UH] (noting that 
the tuition for full-time students who are NC residents was $3509.50). 
 25. S. REG’L EDUC. BD., NORTH CAROLINA COLLEGE AFFORDABILITY PROFILE 2017, at 1 
(2017), https://www.sreb.org/sites/main/files/file-attachments/nc_2017_afford_profile.pdf.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YP9Z-4SJ8]. 
 26. Mitchell, Leachman & Masterson, supra note 17. 
 27. See Doug Webber, Fancy Dorms Aren’t the Main Reason Tuition is Skyrocketing, 
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Sept. 13, 2016, 11:03 AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/fancy-dorms-
arent-the-main-reason-tuition-is-skyrocketing [https://perma.cc/9MY4-LAWP] (noting that “by 
far the single biggest driver of rising tuitions for public colleges has been declining state funding 
for higher education”). But see Jason Delisle, The Disinvestment Hypothesis: Don’t Blame State 
Budget Cuts for Rising Tuition at Public Universities, BROOKINGS INST. (June 1, 2017), 
https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-disinvestment-hypothesis-dont-blame-state-budget-
cuts-for-rising-tuition-at-public-universities [https://perma.cc/JU7J-7NUX] (presenting a rebuke 
of this theory and other theories for the rise in tuition at public universities). 
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of-state institutions, the average in-state tuition at public universities 
now exceeds $10,000,28 a 33 percent increase from a decade ago, when 
adjusted for inflation.29 In light of the increasing cost of higher 
education, both nationwide and in North Carolina, greater attention 
has been paid to the requirement in Article IX, Section 9 of the North 
Carolina Constitution that a university education be provided as free 
as practicable. In fact, in 2014, an advocacy group, named Higher 
Education Works, was founded in North Carolina with the explicit 
purpose of educating legislators and the public about Article IX, 
Section 9.30  
Adherence to a clause requires understanding its meaning. Article 
IX, Section 9 has never been the subject of litigation, so courts have 
never had the opportunity to explain what, if any, legal obligations the 
clause imposes. Arizona’s constitution contains a substantially similar 
clause requiring the State to provide citizens with a university 
education for “as nearly free as possible.”31 However, in Kromko v. 
Arizona Board of Regents, the Arizona Supreme Court, borrowing the 
logic underlying the federal political questions doctrine, ruled that the 
clause contained no “judicially discoverable and manageable 
standards” and thus presented the court with a non-justiciable political 
question.32  
But, in North Carolina, the historical, and therefore legal, 
landscape is different. North Carolina’s constitutional history 
demonstrates an intent to maintain low tuition prices by imposing 
constitutional constraints on the General Assembly’s ability to shift 
 
 28. Briana Boyington, See 20 Years of Tuition Growth at National Universities, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REP. (Sept. 20, 2017, 9:00 AM), https://www.usnews.com/education/best-colleges/paying-
for-college/articles/2017-09-20/see-20-years-of-tuition-growth-at-national-universities [https:// 
perma.cc/H9LL-XZYT]. 
 29. Mitchell, Leachman & Masterson, supra note 17.  
 30. See About, HIGHER EDUC. WORKS, http://www.highereducationworks.org/about 
[https://perma.cc/MMM8-87BF] (“We advocate for investment in North Carolina’s public 
universities and community colleges by building support among citizens and engaging leaders.”).  
 31. ARIZ. CONST., art. XI, § 6.  
 32. Kromko v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 165 P.3d 168, 172 (Ariz. 2007). The court explained its 
use of the federal political question doctrine, saying, “[t]he federal political question doctrine 
flows from the [same] basic principle of separation of powers . . . [as] [o]ur state Constitution.” 
Id. at 170−71. For reasons that are not always clear, many states employ the federal political 
question doctrine, at least in addressing challenges to the adequacy of funding for education under 
their state constitutions. See, e.g., id.; Nelson v. Hawaiian Homes Comm’n, 277 P.3d 279, 288 
(Haw. 2012) (addressing some of the factors from the Supreme Court’s explanation of the federal 
political question doctrine in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)); Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 
249, 253 (N.C. 1997) (same). 
MOORE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 10/27/2018  1:37 PM 
2018] PRACTICABLE AND JUSTICIABLE 377 
funding away from higher education. Specifically, the constitutional 
history reveals that tuition of roughly $1450 per year, in 2017 dollars, 
constitutes the tuition “as free as far as practicable” envisioned by 
Article IX, Section 9.  
After North Carolina ratified a new constitution in 1868, a 
constitution that significantly limited the legislature’s discretion in 
regards to funding for higher education, the cost of tuition did not rise 
significantly for more than 100 years. Yearly tuition at UNC-Chapel 
Hill largely remained below $1450 in present dollars until 1995. That 
amount represents a judicially discoverable and manageable 
standard—we can judge future tuition increases against the 
consistently low tuition of the first 100+ years after ratification.  
Part I traces the history of public funding of higher education in 
North Carolina both before and after the ratification of the 1868 
Constitution. This Part also highlights concerns about university 
funding that the drafters of the 1868 Constitution sought to address 
while also briefly discussing efforts by the federal government to 
encourage states to support public education from 1787–1892. Part II 
analyzes possible roadblocks to litigation over the meaning of Article 
IX, Section 9—specifically standing and the related political question 
doctrine. Part III then draws upon the text of Article IX, Section 9, as 
well as North Carolina’s unique history of support for public higher 
education, to determine that the provision imposes a constitutional 
obligation to keep tuition “free, as far as practicable.” And, finally, Part 
IV discusses three possible remedies a court could employ to address 
the General Assembly’s neglect of its constitutional obligation: 
judicially mandating a change, placing a renewed burden upon the 
legislature, or procedurally altering the funding process.  
I. PUBLIC EDUCATION FUNDING AND THE NORTH CAROLINA 
CONSTITUTION  
The language of Article IX, Section 9 first appeared in North 
Carolina’s 1868 Constitution. The drafters of that Constitution 
included it, as well as a number of other provisions, in an attempt to 
compel the legislature to properly fund the University, something the 
legislature had failed to do under the far more vague 1776 
Constitution.33 Article IX, Section 9 thus must be understood in light 
 
 33. See SNIDER, supra note 12, at 57 (“Except for an early $10,000 loan [from the legislature] 
later converted into a gift, the campus had survived on funds from escheated lands and arrearages, 
private benefactions, two lotteries, and tuition fees.”). 
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of the flaws of the State’s first constitution and the ways in which its 
second attempted to correct for them. The first and second Sections of 
this Part discuss that history. Because two of the provisions added to 
the Education section of North Carolina’s 1868 Constitution draw 
upon national trends in education, the second Section of this Part also 
briefly describes the history of federal support for public education—
both K–12 and higher education—in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. Of course, North Carolina has since ratified a third 
constitution, this one drafted in 1971 with the intent largely to preserve 
the rights guaranteed by the 1868 Constitution.34 The final Section of 
this Part discusses this constitution and the understanding of state 
funding for higher education its drafters sought to preserve.  
A. The Constitution of 1776 
North Carolina’s commitment to providing its citizens with 
affordable public higher education began in 1776, when it included in 
its constitution a call to establish a public university in the State: “a 
school or schools [shall] be established by the Legislature, for the 
convenient instruction of youth, with such salaries to the masters, paid 
by the public, as may enable them to instruct at low prices; and all 
useful learning shall be duly encouraged, and promoted, in one or more 
universities.”35  
The legislature, recognizing the urgency of the constitution’s 
language, acted quickly after the end of the American Revolution to 
establish and fund the University of North Carolina, which would later 
become the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Accordingly, 
in 1789, the legislature passed a bill establishing a university, writing in 
the bill’s preamble that “an [sic] University supported by permanent 
funds and well-endowed would have the most direct tendency to” 
ensure its graduates are fit for “honourable discharge of the social 
duties of life.”36 Eleven days later, the legislature fulfilled the 
preamble’s promise of a “well-endowed” University by passing what is 
 
 34. See John V. Orth, North Carolina Constitutional History, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1759, 1790 
(1992) (“[The 1971 constitution] was instead a good-government measure, long-matured and 
carefully crafted by the state’s leading lawyers and politicians, designed to consolidate and 
conserve the best features of the past, not to break with it.”). 
 35. N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XLI, in 5 THORPE, supra note 1, at 2794.  
 36. William R. Davie’s Bill to Establish the University of North Carolina (Nov. 12, 1789), in 
1 A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA 1776-1799, at 23 
(R.D.W. Connor, Louis R. Wilson & Hugh T. Lefler eds., Univ. N.C. Press 1953).  
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popularly known as the Escheats Act.37 The act awarded to the 
University “all the property that has heretofore or shall hereafter 
escheat to the state.”38  
Not long after its founding, however, the State stopped providing 
sufficient funds to the University. In 1796, the legislature attempted to 
reclaim the escheats granted in 1789, an action the North Carolina 
Supreme Court deemed unconstitutional.39 The legislature was only 
briefly thwarted. While the University retained the prior escheats, the 
legislature did not appropriate any other funds for the University until 
after the Civil War.40 Multiple University presidents tried—and 
failed—to obtain additional funds from the legislature, despite 
consistent increases in enrollment.41  
The lack of funding hampered the University, and its quality 
suffered. So desperate was the University that it took students in need 
of “remedial instruction.”42 The campus was in disrepair, requiring 
then University President Joseph Caldwell to travel the State in 1814 
begging for money just to complete the roof of the campus’s main 
building.43 Occasionally, the University even had to borrow money to 
pay faculty salaries.44 In addition, it was perceived by at least some as 
accessible only to North Carolina’s elite.45 By 1833, tuition had risen to 
 
 37. SNIDER, supra note 12, at 11.  
 38. AN ACT FOR THE ENDOWMENT OF THE UNIVERSITY, in A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA 1776-1799, supra note 36, at 45. 
 39. See REPORT OF THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE CONSTITUTION STUDY COMMISSION 138 
(1968) [hereinafter CONSTITUTION STUDY COMMISSION] (noting that the North Carolina 
Supreme Court invalidated the legislature’s attempt to repeal the escheats statute of 1789 “on the 
ground that it constituted a taking of vested property other than by the law of the land, in violation 
of the constitution”). 
 40. See SNIDER, supra note 12, at 57 (“Except for an early $10,000 loan [from the legislature] 
later converted into a gift, the campus had survived on funds from escheated lands and arrearages, 
private benefactions, two lotteries, and tuition fees.”), 59 (“The student body grew from about 89 
at the time of [UNC President Swain’s] arrival to over 450 by the opening of the Civil War. . . . 
However, Swain failed to obtain support from the General Assembly, no matter how hard he 
tried.”). 
 41. See id. at 29 (“[I]n July 1795 . . . the enrollment had risen to forty-one . . . .”), 59 (“The 
student body grew from about 89 at the time of [UNC President Swain’s] arrival to over 450 by 
the opening of the Civil War.”). 
 42. Id. at 29; see id. at 59 (“Scholastic standards were low and seemed to be kept that way as 
‘if in appeal for more students.’”). 
 43. Id. at 43. 
 44. Id. at 51.  
 45. Id. at 81 (citing a contemporary newspaper report describing pre-Civil War perceptions 
of the University as catering only to landed elites). 
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$30.46 Five years later it jumped to $50.47 By the end of the Civil War, 
it was $100.48 These compounding financial woes and lack of support 
from the legislature ultimately led David Swain, who served as 
University President from 1835 to 1868, to conclude that the University 
must survive “on its own.”49  
B. The 1868 Constitution  
The University was not left on its own for long. In the late 1860s, 
the United States required the defeated states of the Confederacy to 
draft new state constitutions.50 Drafters of North Carolina’s 
Reconstruction-era constitution took this opportunity to correct for 
the harm caused by the legislature’s failure to fund the University. 
They accomplished this through the addition of an entire article 
devoted to “Education,” which included a number of provisions 
designed to constrain the legislature’s discretion in funding higher 
education.51  
One goal behind imposing these new constraints was to change the 
perception of some that higher education was only meant for elites. For 
example, the drafters declared that the State must provide a university 
education to its citizens free of expense, “as far as practicable.”52 
Because of its high tuition prices, some viewed attendance at the 
 
 46. UNIV. OF N.C., CATALOGUE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA 1833-34, at 10 
(1832) (listing tuition “per session,” comparable to a semester, as $15). 
 47. UNIV. OF N.C., CATALOGUE OF THE TRUSTEES, FACULTY AND STUDENTS OF THE 
UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA 1838-39, at 14 (1838). 
 48. UNIV. OF N.C., CATALOGUE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA 1864-66, at 30 
(1866).  
 49. See SNIDER, supra note 12, at 59 (“However, Swain failed to obtain support from the 
General Assembly, no matter how hard he tried. The university, he soon learned, must live ‘on 
its own,’ as it had from its birth.”). 
 50. Reconstruction Acts of 1867-68, ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428, ch. 6, 15 Stat. 2 (1867). 
 51. See N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, § 5, in 5 THORPE, supra note 1, at 2817–18 (“The 
University of North Carolina . . . shall be held to an inseparable connection with the free public-
school system of the State.”); id. art. IX, § 6 (“[A]ll the property which has heretofore accrued to 
the State, or shall hereafter accrue, from escheats, unclaimed dividends, or distributive shares of 
the estates of deceased persons, shall be appropriated to the use of the university.”); id. art. IX,  
§ 16 (“As soon as practicable after the adoption of this constitution, the general assembly shall 
establish and maintain, in connection with the university, a department of agriculture, of 
mechanics, of mining, and of normal instruction.”); see also infra notes 75–76 and accompanying 
text (explaining that instructing the General Assembly to establish a department of agriculture, 
mechanics, mining, and normal instruction was tantamount to a directive to ensure the State 
qualified for funds under the Morrill Act of 1868). 
 52. N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, § 6, in 5 THORPE, supra note 1, at 2817. 
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University as accessible only to the State’s wealthy citizens.53 This 
provision reaffirmed the State’s intention to ensure the University was 
accessible to all.  
Other changes directly addressed the failings of the 1776 
Constitution. The second clause of the newly added article on 
Education required that the State continue to give the University the 
escheats that the state legislature had attempted, but failed, to take 
back, guaranteeing that “all property which has heretofore accrued to 
the State, or shall hereafter accrue from escheats . . . shall be 
appropriated to the use of the University.”54 By enshrining this reversal 
in the State’s constitution, the drafters ensured that, absent a 
constitutional amendment, the University could never be deprived of 
the State’s escheats.  
Some of the constraints stemmed from the federal government’s 
efforts to encourage state support for public education. Article IX, 
Section 5 declared, “[t]he University of North Carolina . . . shall be held 
to an inseparable connection with the free public school system of the 
State.”55 That clause might seem merely aspirational today, but it 
signified a very specific meaning to those who wrote it. Over the course 
of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the federal government 
used land grants to encourage states to establish comprehensive 
systems of public education, including universities.56 This effort 
resulted in states inserting into their constitutions commitments to 
comprehensive systems of public education.57 It began with the 
Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which provided that, in the new U.S. 
territories, “schools and the means of education shall forever be 
encouraged.”58 The federal government succeeded in instilling a 
commitment to state-supported education in these territories—every 
 
 53. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.  
 54. N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, § 6, in 5 THORPE, supra note 1, at 2817. 
 55. Id. art. IX, § 5, in 5 THORPE, supra note 1, at 2817. 
 56. See Adam Sherman & Hugh Spitzer, Washington State’s Mandate: The Constitutional 
Obligation to Fund Post-Secondary Education, 89 WASH. L. REV. ONLINE 15, 18–20 (2014) 
(explaining how sale of land allocated to each state’s congressional delegation funded the 
“creation of land-grant colleges”).   
 57. See id. at 20 (“[B]etween 1860 and 1889, every state . . . except West Virginia, referenced 
colleges or universities in their founding constitutions. . . . Perhaps nothing illustrates the growing 
national call for institutions of higher education more than the Morrill Act of 1862[,] . . . [which] 
spurred state after state to enter the higher education field.”).  
 58. Northwest Ordinance of 1789, Ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50, 52 (1789) (reenacting the Northwest 
Ordinance of 1787). 
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state created by the Northwest Ordinance included a section about 
supporting public education in its constitution.59  
In the years following that success, the federal government 
attempted to do the same with higher education, granting anywhere 
from 40,000 to 100,000 acres of land each to seventeen territories-
turned-states before the outbreak of the Civil War.60 Fifteen of the 
seventeen mentioned higher education in their founding constitution.61 
Some state constitutions, like Alabama’s 1819 Constitution, even 
called for additional state support of the universities founded through 
federal land grants.62  
The Morrill Land Grant Act of 1862,63 which gave states western 
lands to be sold to fund agricultural and mechanical education, was the 
 
 59. See generally IND. CONST. of 1851, art. VIII, § 1, in 2 THORPE, supra note 1, at 1086 (“[I]t 
shall be the duty of the General Assembly . . . to provide by law for a general and uniform system 
of common schools, wherein tuition shall be without charge, and equally open to all.”); MICH. 
CONST. of 1850, art. XIII, § 1, in 4 THORPE, supra note 1, at 1961 (“The superintendent of public 
instruction shall have the general supervision of public instruction, and his duties shall be 
prescribed by law.”); OHIO CONST. of 1851, art. VI, § 2, in 5 THORPE, supra note 1, at 2925 (“The 
General Assembly shall make such provisions . . . [that] will secure a thorough and efficient 
system of common schools throughout the state . . . .”); WIS. CONST. of 1848, art. X, § 1, in 7 
THORPE, supra note 1, at 4103 (“The supervision of public instruction shall be vested in a state 
superintendent and such other officers as the legislature shall direct . . . .”). 
 60. JOHN R. THELIN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION 75–76 (2d ed. 2011). 
 61. See generally ALA. CONST. of 1875, art. XII, § 9, in 1 THORPE, supra note 1, at 177 (“the 
State University and the Agricultural and Mechanical College”); ARK. CONST. of 1874, art. XIV, 
§ 2, in 1 THORPE, supra note 1, at 358 (“schools or universities”); CAL. CONST. of 1879, art. IX, § 
9, in 1 THORPE, supra note 1, at 432 (“the University of California”); FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. 
XII, § 14, in 2 THORPE, supra note 1, at 754 (permitting the establishment of two “normal 
schools,” which were institutions of higher education focused on training primary school 
teachers); ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. VIII, § 2, in 2 THORPE, supra note 1, at 1035 (“college, 
seminary, or university purposes”); IOWA CONST. of 1857, art. IX, § 11, in 2 THORPE, supra note 
1, at 1151 (“[t]he State University”); LA. CONST. of 1879, art. 230, in 3 THORPE, supra note 1, at 
1509 (“[t]he University of Louisiana”); MICH. CONST. of 1850, art. XIII, § 7, in 4 THORPE, supra 
note 1, at 1961 (“the University of Michigan”); MINN. CONST. of 1857, art. VIII, § 4, in 4 THORPE, 
supra note 1, at 2009 (“the University of Minnesota”); MISS. CONST. of 1868, art. VIII, § 8, in 4 
THORPE, supra note 1, at 2081 (“an agricultural college or colleges”); MO. CONST. of 1875, art. 
XI, § 5, in 4 THORPE, supra note 1, at 2263 (“the State University”); OR. CONST. of 1857, art. 
VIII, § 5, in 5 THORPE, supra note 1, at 3011 (“university lands” and “university funds”); TENN. 
CONST. of 1870, art. XI, § 12, in 6 THORPE, supra note 1, at 3469 (“The above provisions shall not 
prevent the Legislature from carrying into effect any laws that have been passed in favor of the 
colleges, universities, or academies . . . .”); WIS. CONST. of 1848, art. X, § 6, in 7 THORPE, supra 
note 1, at 4092 (“a state university”). 
 62. See ALA. CONST. of 1819, art. VI, in 1 THORPE, supra note 1, at 110 (“The general 
assembly shall . . . [use money raised from federally granted lands] for the exclusive support of a 
State University.”).  
 63. Land-Grant Agricultural and Mechanical College (Morrill) Act of 1862, Pub. L. No. 37-
130, 12 Stat. 503 (codified at 7 U.S.C §§ 301–308 (2012)). 
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federal government’s most ambitious attempt to encourage support for 
higher education. The act doled out 30,000 acres per representative in 
Congress64—over 17,400,000 acres, worth more than $7.5 million in 
1862 dollars.65 The Morrill Land Grant Act, like the Northwest 
Ordinance and the individual land grants before it, influenced state 
constitutions. In the three decades between the first and second Morrill 
Land Grand Acts,66 all but one state constitution drafted and ratified 
included a provision related to higher education.67 
Thus, by the end of the nineteenth century, language tying 
together public universities and the public K–12 education system was 
common. Though their constitutions were drafted after North 
Carolina’s, Colorado and Washington’s inclusion of universities and 
normal schools68 within their visions for comprehensive systems of 
public education is indicative of the fact that drafters of state 
constitutions during this time understood systems of public education 
to include higher education. Article IX of Colorado’s constitution calls 
for maintenance of a “thorough and uniform” public education 
system.69 Meanwhile, in Article VIII, the drafters included three 
colleges among the educational institutions that must be “supported by 
 
 64. Id. § 1, 12 Stat. at 503 
 65. MICHAEL L. WHALEN, A LAND-GRANT UNIVERSITY 7 (2002), reprinted from CORNELL 
UNIVERSITY 2001-02 FINANCIAL PLAN (2001).  
 66. The second Morrill Act focused on promoting agricultural and mechanical education for 
African Americans. See Agricultural College (Morrill) Act of 1890, Pub. L. No. 51-841, 26 Stat. 
417 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 321–328 (2012)) (requiring states that benefited from the 
Morrill Act of 1862 that also have segregated colleges to divide funds from the Act evenly 
between “one college for white students and one institution for colored students”). 
 67. See generally COLO. CONST. of 1876, art. IX, § 12, in 1 THORPE, supra note 1, at 496 (“the 
University of Colorado”); KAN. CONST. of 1858, art. VII, § 7, in 2 THORPE, supra note 1, at 1232 
(“a complete system of public instruction, embracing . . . collegiate and university departments”); 
MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. XI, § 11, in 4 THORPE, supra note 1, at 2324 (“the State University”); 
NEB. CONST. of 1866–67, art. II §§ 1–2, in 4 THORPE, supra note 1, at 2358 (dictating the minimum 
price at which “university lands” may be sold); NEV. CONST. of 1864, art. XI, § 4, in 4 THORPE, 
supra note 1, at 2419 (“a State University”); N.D. CONST. of 1889, art. 8, § 148, in 5 THORPE, supra 
note 1, at 2872 (“a uniform system for free public schools . . . including the normal and collegiate 
course”); S.D. CONST. of 1889, art. VIII, § 7, in 6 THORPE, supra note 1, at 3374 (“[resources] from 
the United States or any other source for a university”).  
 68. Normal schools were institutions of higher education focused on the training of primary 
school teachers. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
 69. COLO. CONST. of 1876, art. IX, § 2, in 1 THORPE, supra note 1, at 494. 
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the State.”70 Washington’s constitution uses similar language.71 This 
language was not only commonplace, but also held real implications 
for the funding of public universities. For nearly two decades after the 
drafting of its constitution, Washington’s universities were tuition-
free72 and legislation “lumped” the University of Washington’s funding 
in with the “general and uniform system of public schools,” which 
included “common schools, high schools, normal schools, and technical 
schools.”73  
Thus, when drafters of North Carolina’s 1868 Constitution 
announced their intent to hold the University “to an inseparable 
connection with the free public-school system of the State,”74 they 
intended to constitutionalize a commitment to affordable education at 
every level, including universities. The final provision the drafters 
added in relation to higher education flows directly from the first 
Morrill Land Grant Act. Section 16 instructed that “[a]s soon as 
practicable after the adoption of this Constitution, the general 
assembly shall establish and maintain, in connection with the 
university, a department of agriculture, of mechanics, of mining and of 
normal instruction.”75 This clause made the State eligible for funds 
from the Morrill Act.76 The General Assembly took the “as soon as 
practicable” language here seriously; it made the reopening of the 
University in 1875 contingent upon its ability to provide agricultural 
and mechanical education.77 
 
 70. Id. art. VIII, § 1, in 1 THORPE, supra note 1, at 493; see also id. art. VIII, § 5, in 1 THORPE, 
supra note 1, at 494 (“The University at Boulder [and other institutions] . . . [are] subject to the 
control of the State.”). 
 71. See WASH. CONST. of 1889, art. XIII, in 7 THORPE, supra note 1, at 3998 (listing 
educational institutions that “shall be fostered and supported by the state”); see also Sherman & 
Spitzer, supra note 56, at 28–29 (reciting the language of Article XIII, Section 1 of the Washington 
State Constitution).  
 72. Sherman & Spitzer, supra note 56, at 35. 
 73. Id. at 27–28. 
 74. N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, § 5, in 5 THORPE, supra note 1, at 2817. 
 75. Id. art. IX, § 16, in 5 THORPE, supra note 1, at 2818. 
 76. The language of Section 16 requires the teaching of “agriculture” and “mechanics.” Id. 
The Morrill Act of 1862 required states “to teach such branches of learning as are related to 
agriculture and the mechanic arts” in order to receive the lands. Land-Grant Agricultural and 
Mechanical College (Morrill) Act of 1862, Pub. L. No. 37-130, § 4, 12 Stat. 503, 504 (codified at 7 
U.S.C § 304 (2012)). 
 77. William D. Snider documented the incidents surrounding the reopening of the 
University:  
After prolonged study the trustees saw their only hope in persuading the General 
Assembly to revalidate the agricultural and mechanical college Land Scrip Fund, 
obtained by Governor Swain from the federal government in 1867 under the Morrill 
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The drafters succeeded in making higher education more 
affordable. In 1869, the Governor declared at commencement, in 
remarks reproduced in the North Carolina Standard, that, pre-1868 the 
University “practically excluded . . . the children of the great body of 
people.”78 However, with the ratification of the State’s Reconstruction 
constitution, he declared the University to be “a popular institution . . 
. . It is now the people’s University.”79 The state legislature 
appropriated $7500 annually to the University in addition to the 
escheats.80 When the University reopened in 1875, tuition dropped 
from the $100 charged in 186881 or the $80 charged just before the 
University’s brief closure in 187082 to $60.83 In 1924, tuition was $80.84 
Even at the height of the Great Depression, tuition was only $75.85 
C. The Constitution of 1971 
North Carolina’s current constitution was drafted in 1968 by a 
study commission appointed by the North Carolina Bar Association 
and North Carolina State Bar.86 It was, as one commentator put it, “a 
good-government measure, long-matured and carefully crafted by the 
state’s leading lawyers and politicians, designed to consolidate and 
 
Act. [Due to the Board of Trustees having lost that money in a bond scandal t]he state 
remained responsible to the federal government for restoring the principal, but in a 
closely contested fight the General Assembly authorized the state to pay an annual sum 
of $7500 to the university as interest on the money, provided the university offered 
agricultural and mechanical instruction. 
SNIDER, supra note 12, at 89–90 (emphasis added). UNC-Chapel Hill’s use of Morrill Act funds 
would remain a controversy until those irked by UNC-Chapel Hill’s perceived lack of 
commitment to agricultural education persuaded the legislature to launch a university focused 
specifically on agricultural and mechanical instruction. SCOTT M. GELBER, THE UNIVERSITY 
AND THE PEOPLE: ENVISIONING AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION IN AN ERA OF POPULIST 
PROTEST 37 (2011). That university became what is presently North Carolina State University. Id.  
 78. The University Commencement, N.C. STANDARD 2 (June 12, 1869). 
 79. Id.  
 80. SNIDER, supra note 12, at 90. 
 81. UNIV. OF N.C., CATALOGUE OF THE TRUSTEES, FACULTY AND STUDENTS OF THE 
UNIV. OF N.C. 1867-’68, at 24 (1870). 
 82. UNIV. OF N.C., CATALOGUE OF THE TRUSTEES, FACULTY AND STUDENTS OF THE 
UNIV. OF N.C. 1869-’70, at 15 (1870). 
 83. UNIV. OF N.C., CATALOGUE OF THE TRUSTEES, FACULTY AND STUDENTS OF THE 
UNIV. OF N.C., 1875-’76, at 13 (1876). 
 84. UNIV. OF N.C., THE CATALOGUE 1923-1924, at 61 (1924) (showing an annual tuition in 
1924 of $20 per quarter, for a total of $80 per year). 
 85. UNIV. OF N.C., CATALOGUE ISSUE 1933-1934, at 29, 44 (1934) (listing tuition as $25 per 
quarter, comprising one third of the academic year). 
 86. CONSTITUTION STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 39, at i. 
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conserve the best features of the past, not to break with it.”87 The 
Commission itself explained that “none [of the changes are] calculated 
to impair any present right of the individual citizen or to bring about 
any fundamental change in the power of state and local government or 
the distribution of that power.”88  
Changes to Article IX were limited and mostly served to 
constitutionalize contemporary practices. The Commission’s 
commentary on Article IX provides just one mention of higher 
education, explaining that wording changes to what is currently Section 
9 exist only “to take account of the duty of the State to maintain 
institutions of higher education in addition to the University of North 
Carolina.”89 In 1868, North Carolina had just one university; drafters 
of the 1971 Constitution were merely noting that it was now home to 
sixteen.90 Otherwise, the Commission saw no need to change the 
constitution’s requirement that the General Assembly provide citizens 
with a university education as free as practicable.  
Perhaps that was because the clause was working. At the time the 
State’s constitution was being redrafted and ratified, tuition prices 
were, adjusted for inflation, remarkably similar to prices when the 
University reopened in 1875. At $225 per year when the constitution 
was ratified in 1971,91 the cost was only eleven dollars more than the 
inflation-adjusted cost in 1875.92  
The Commission also eliminated clauses that were no longer 
needed. Gone was the requirement that the legislature work with the 
University to create a program of agricultural and mechanical 
instruction;93 the clause was no longer necessary because, by 1971, 
 
 87. Orth, supra note 34, at 1790. 
 88. CONSTITUTION STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 39, at 10. 
 89. Id. at 88.  
 90. See id. (“Proposed Sec. 8 extends present Sec. 6 (which deals only with the University) 
to take account of the duty of the State to maintain institutions of higher education in addition to 
the University of North Carolina.”). By 1968, North Carolina had sixteen public universities; three 
were joined to create the University of North Carolina in 1931, three more joined the University 
by the late 1960s, and the remaining ten public universities joined the University in 1971. 220 
Years of History, supra note 21. 
 91. UNIV. OF N.C. AT CHAPEL HILL, THE UNDERGRADUATE BULLETIN 132 (1970). 
 92. An amount of $60 in 1875 would be worth $214.40 in 1971, adjusted for inflation using 
information provided in supra note 4.  
 93. Compare N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, § 16, in 5 THORPE, supra note 1, at 2818 (“As 
soon as practicable after the adoption of this constitution, the general assembly shall establish and 
maintain, in connection with the university, a department of agriculture, of mechanics, of mining, 
and of normal instruction.”), with N.C. CONST. art. IX (omitting such references to agriculture 
and mechanics). 
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North Carolina was home to not one, but two, specialized institutions 
devoted to mechanical and agricultural education.94  
The Commission also acknowledged that UNC-Chapel Hill had 
changed how it used escheats. Because of generous funding from the 
State, the Trustees of UNC-Chapel Hill, in 1946, had ceased to draw 
upon the principal of escheats. Instead, the Trustees began to use 
funding from escheat interest only to provide scholarships to low-
income students, and not to fund the University’s operations.95 The 
Commission, therefore, recommended that the State be granted any 
escheats after 1970, with the condition that the escheats be used to 
provide need-based scholarships to low-income North Carolina 
students attending one of the State’s public universities.96 North 
Carolina’s citizens ratified the recommendations via referendum on 
Election Day 1970.97 
D. Increases in Tuition in the Present Day 
In the late 1990s, tuition at UNC-Chapel Hill began to rise more 
rapidly. In 1996, tuition first broke the $1000 mark.98 While tuition in 
1994–1995, $874,99 was slightly less than double the amount from ten 
 
 94. See Jimmy Ryals, Land-Grant Legacy, N.C. ST. NEWS (July 2, 2012), https://news. 
ncsu.edu/2012/07/land-grant-legacy [https://perma.cc/WN9J-KWKM] (“The Morrill Act 
universities were established to teach agricultural and mechanical arts . . . . In North Carolina, the 
law birthed the North Carolina College of Agriculture and Mechanic Arts (now NC State). A 
second Morrill Act in 1890 led to the establishment of North Carolina Agricultural and Technical 
State University.”). 
 95. See CONSTITUTION STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 39, at 138–39 (“Until 1946, both the 
principal and interest of the escheats were used for any purpose by the University Trustees. In 
[1946], however, the Trustees determined that the principal of the escheats fund should be kept 
intact, that the net income should be distributed among the three . . . campuses of The University 
in proportion to enrollment, and that it should be used only for scholarships to needy North 
Carolina residents . . . .”).  
 96. Id. at 137, 139 (“We believe that equity requires that the benefits of the escheats, being 
derived from property owners throughout the entire State, be made available to any needy and 
worthy North Carolinian who is enrolled in any public institution of higher education in this 
State.”). 
 97. The North Carolina Constitution was presented to voters and approved in 1970. Orth, 
supra note 34, at 1760. 
 98. UNIV. OF N.C., UNIV. OF N.C. AT CHAPEL HILL TUITION AND FEES 1996-1997 (1996) 
https://cashier.unc.edu/files/2016/05/AY-1996-97-and-summer-1997.pdf [https://perma.cc/2B6Z-
FL7W] (showing tuition per semester for a full load as $693, for a total of $1386). 
 99. UNIV. OF N.C., UNIV. OF N.C. AT CHAPEL HILL TUITION AND FEES 1994-1995 (1994) 
https://cashier.unc.edu/files/2016/05/AY-1994-95-and-summer-1995.pdf [https://perma.cc/6RWZ-
WQMC] (showing tuition per semester for a full load as $437, for a total of $874). 
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years prior,100 tuition in 2005, $3205, was nearly four times as much as 
it had been a decade earlier.101 
The Great Recession of 2008 exacerbated this problem. In its 
wake, the General Assembly reduced funding for higher education, 
leading the UNC System to impose tuition increases.102 Whereas in 
2008, a North Carolina family would need to devote 15 percent of its 
income to sending a child to a four-year public university, by 2014, the 
number was 25.7 percent.103 The increases led some to ask whether 
“working families [can] still afford UNC?”104 
II. PROCEDURAL IMPEDIMENTS TO BRINGING AN ARTICLE IX, 
SECTION 9 CHALLENGE 
This Part explains why two common procedural impediments do 
not bar a challenge alleging that the North Carolina State Legislature 
has failed to adhere to Article IX, Section 9.  
First, this Part quickly disposes of concerns that students—the 
most obvious plaintiffs in hypothetical litigation regarding Article IX, 
Section 9—might lack standing. It then demonstrates how an Article 
IX, Section 9 challenge can survive the political question doctrine. 
Because North Carolina’s courts have historically played an important 
role in expounding on the meaning of the State’s constitution and 
because there is sufficient historical evidence to identify judicially 
discoverable and manageable standards within the clause, a challenge 
under Article IX, Section 9 likely succeeds where the Kromko 
litigation in Arizona failed. 
 
 100. UNIV. OF N.C., UNIV. OF N.C. AT CHAPEL HILL TUITION AND FEES 1984-1985 (1984) 
https://cashier.unc.edu/files/2016/05/AY-1984-85-and-summer-1985.pdf [https://perma.cc/B7MA-
XFLA] (showing tuition per semester for a full load as $240, for a total of $480). 
 101. UNIV. OF N.C., UNIV. OF N.C. AT CHAPEL HILL TUITION AND FEES 2004-2005 (2004) 
https://cashier.unc.edu/files/2016/05/AY-2004-05-and-summer-2005-includes-important-
dates.pdf [https://perma.cc/3VA8-6TT3] (showing tuition per semester for a full load as $1602.50, 
for a total of $3205). 
 102. See Rob Christensen, Can Working Families Still Afford UNC?, NEWS & OBSERVER 
(Mar. 10, 2015) https://www.newsobserver.com/news/politics-government/politics-columns-
blogs/rob-christensen/article13229168.html [https://perma.cc/CEF3-X4NP] (“The tuition 
increases are a means of compensating for declining state funding and rising costs. State 
appropriations to the UNC system have declined since 2008-2009 . . . .”).  
 103. S. REG’L EDUC. BD., supra note 25, at 1. 
 104. Christensen, supra note 102. 
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A. Standing 
Standing to seek declaratory or injunctive relief would not pose a 
significant impediment to students looking to challenge the 
legislature’s adherence to Article IX, Section 9. The North Carolina 
Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act provides that “the right of a 
citizen and taxpayer to maintain an action in the courts to restrain the 
unlawful use of public funds to his injury cannot be denied.”105 State 
courts have ruled that this Act permits the use of declaratory judgment 
as a means of determining the validity of legislative action.106  
It is possible that students could also bring a suit for an injunction 
or even damages. In Craig ex rel. Craig v. New Hanover County Board 
of Education,107 the North Carolina Supreme Court held that when a 
challenge is made under the state constitution, sovereign immunity 
cannot act as a bar to the claim.108 North Carolina’s constitutional 
“Declaration of Rights” guarantees that all citizens “have a right to the 
privilege of education” and promises that “it is the duty of the State to 
guard and maintain that right.”109 Thus, if a hypothetical plaintiff 
fashioned the claim as one under the “Declaration of Rights,” damages 
or injunctive relief would be available as potential remedies. 
Moreover, were a student to bring a lawsuit alleging that the State 
has violated Article IX, Section 9, the challenge would likely resemble 
K–12 education funding cases in North Carolina, where parents have 
successfully challenged the State’s funding scheme for public-schools 
seeking additional funding.110 Like those parents, students would be 
unlikely to face a serious standing challenge because North Carolina 
recognizes taxpayer standing.111 This does not mean that North 
Carolina’s citizens can challenge policies they “merely disagree 
 
 105. Teer v. Jordan, 59 S.E.2d 359, 362 (N.C. 1950). 
 106. See Town of Emerald Isle v. State, 360 S.E.2d 756, 760 (N.C. 1987) (“A declaratory 
judgment may be used to determine the construction and validity of a statute.” (citation omitted)). 
 107. Craig ex rel. Craig v. New Hanover Cty. Bd. of Educ., 678 S.E.2d 351 (N.C. 2009). 
 108. Id. at 354. That case relied on Corum v. University of North Carolina, where the North 
Carolina Supreme Court held that claims alleging violation by the state of rights contained in the 
state constitution’s “Declaration of Rights,” could not be barred by sovereign immunity. Corum 
v. Univ. of N.C., 413 S.E.2d 276, 290 (N.C. 1992). 
 109. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 15. 
 110. See, e.g., Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 252 (N.C. 1997) (noting that plaintiffs 
challenging “the current school funding system” are “students and their parents or guardians 
from . . . relatively poor school systems”). 
 111. See Goldston v. State, 637 S.E.2d 876, 881 (N.C. 2006) (“[O]ur cases demonstrate that a 
taxpayer has standing to bring an action against appropriate government officials for the alleged 
misuse or misappropriation of public funds.”). 
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with.”112 Still, “the right of a citizen and taxpayer to maintain an action 
in the courts to restrain the unlawful use of public funds to his injury 
cannot be denied.”113 
B. Political Question Doctrine 
The political question doctrine is invoked when, “[d]espite the 
presence of all of the other elements of an Article III case or 
controversy, the Court forbears on the ground that something about 
the subject matter of the case makes it inappropriate for judicial 
resolution.”114 The doctrine has played an outsized role in education 
litigation. In the last twenty years, a number of states have ruled that 
constitutional challenges to the adequacy of funding of K–12 education 
presented non-justiciable political questions.115 Most directly on point, 
in Kromko,116 Arizona’s Supreme Court held that the political question 
doctrine barred a lawsuit alleging that the State had failed to adhere to 
a provision of the State’s constitution that, similar to North Carolina’s 
Article IX, Section 9, mandates that higher education be offered for 
“as nearly free as possible.”117  
One might wonder why a component of the federal courts’ 
justiciability doctrine would play any role in adjudicating claims 
brought under state constitutions. States employ the federal political 
question doctrine almost without variation.118 This is, as the Kromko 
court explained, because “[t]he federal political question doctrine 
flows from the basic principle of separation of powers and recognizes 
that some decisions are entrusted under the federal constitution to 
 
 112. Id. 
 113. Teer v. Jordan, 59 S.E.2d 359, 362 (N.C. 1950).  
 114. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. 
SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 237 (7th 
ed. 2015).  
 115. See Julia A. Simon-Kerr & Robynn K. Sturm, Justiciability and the Role of Courts in 
Adequacy Litigation: Preserving the Constitutional Right to Education, 6 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 83, 
84 (2010) (“[S]tate courts have delivered a string of disappointing decisions to adequacy plaintiffs. 
While those courts have articulated a variety of state-specific rationales for rejecting adequacy 
claims, their opinions reveal a common concern with the boundaries between their judicial role 
and the prerogatives of the legislature.”). 
 116. Kromko v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 165 P.3d 168 (Ariz. 2007). 
 117. Id. at 172. 
 118. See, e.g., id. at 170 (employing the federal political question doctrine); Nelson v. 
Hawaiian Homes Comm’n, 277 P.3d 279, 288 (Haw. 2012) (same). 
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branches of government other than the judiciary. . . . [State] courts 
refrain from addressing political questions for the same reasons.”119  
The political question doctrine is derived from the principle of 
separation of powers; a duty—or desire—of the courts not to interfere 
with the responsibilities of other branches.120 That concept is a double-
edged sword. Under the separation of powers, it is the responsibility of 
courts to determine “whether a matter has . . . been committed by the 
Constitution to another branch of government, or whether the action 
of that branch exceeds whatever authority has been committed.”121 
Thus, the fact that a suit involves political matters is not enough to 
warrant dismissal.122 
On the federal level, in Baker v. Carr,123 the Supreme Court laid 
out the factors it looks to in determining whether a dispute presents a 
political question.124 And while Baker laid out six factors,125 later cases 
have emphasized the importance of two: “a textually demonstrable 
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political 
department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable 
standards for resolving it.”126  
Neither of the central factors of the political question doctrine bar 
consideration of Article IX, Section 9.127 Because the North Carolina 
Supreme Court has historically played a larger role in expounding 
upon the meaning of the State’s constitution, it is unlikely that Article 
 
 119. Kromko, 165 P.3d at 170 (citation omitted). 
 120. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962). 
 121. Id. at 211. 
 122. See id. (“[I]t is error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign 
relations lies beyond judicial cognizance.”). 
 123. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
 124. Id. at 217. 
 125. Id. (listing the six factors).  
 126. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 195 (2012) (quoting Nixon v. 
United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228 (1993)).  
 127. Nor do any of the remaining factors. Those other factors include: 
the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly 
for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent 
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of 
government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision 
already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements 
by various departments on one question. 
Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. In addition to directing courts’ attention only to the first two factors, 
Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in Zivotofsky noted that courts ordinarily will not find the final 
three factors present, especially in cases not dealing with foreign affairs. See Zivotofsky, 566 U.S. 
at 204–06 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (explaining how the final three Baker factors are rarely 
implicated, but noting cases, mainly in the area of foreign affairs, where they have been relevant). 
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IX, Section 9 exudes a textually demonstrable constitutional 
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department. In fact, 
the North Carolina Supreme Court rejected that very argument in a 
challenge to the legislature’s funding of K–12 education.128 Meanwhile, 
evidence of the clause’s meaning to those who drafted it and, later, to 
those who ensured it was carried forward into the State’s latest 
constitution, provides judicially manageable standards. 
1. Textually Demonstrable Constitutional Commitment to a 
Coordinate Branch. One potential hurdle to a legal challenge involving 
Article IX, Section 9 is that the State could argue Article IX, Section 9 
commits funding of higher education to the discretion of the 
legislature. That argument is unlikely to succeed.  
First, North Carolina’s courts specifically have been reluctant to 
accept that they lack jurisdiction over challenges involving the meaning 
of constitutional text.129  
In part because their justices and judges are elected,130 North 
Carolina’s courts play a larger role in shaping state policy, at least to 
the extent that it involves the state constitution, than do federal courts 
in shaping national policy.131 North Carolina courts have historically 
helped other branches understand the State’s constitution. Some state 
constitutions permit their courts to issue advisory opinions to the 
legislature or governor.132 The North Carolina Supreme Court has 
 
 128. See Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 254 (N.C. 1997) (“Therefore, it is the duty of this 
Court to address plaintiff-parties’ constitutional challenge to the state’s public education system. 
Defendants’ argument is without merit.”). 
 129. See id. at 253–54 (citing cases wherein North Carolina courts have assumed the duty to 
interpret the constitution, including when government action is challenged as unconstitutional).  
 130. N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 16. 
 131. Cf. John V. Orth, The Role of the Judiciary in Making Public Policy, in NORTH 
CAROLINA FOCUS: AN ANTHOLOGY ON STATE GOVERNMENT, POLITICS, AND POLICY 339, 341 
(Mebane Rash Whitman & Ran Coble eds., N.C. Ctr. for Pub. Pol’y Res. 1989) (highlighting the 
role of North Carolina judges in making public policy choices by noting the failed movement to 
replace common law with statutory law to constrain judicial discretion and the movement towards 
having an elected judiciary, as opposed to an appointed judiciary as in the federal courts, to ensure 
judges’ accountability as policy-makers).  
 132. See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 3 (“The supreme court shall give its opinion upon 
important questions upon solemn occasions when required by the governor, the senate, or the 
house of representatives . . . .”); ME. CONST. art. VI, § 3 (“[T]he Supreme Judicial Court shall be 
obliged to give their opinion upon important questions of law, and upon solemn occasions, when 
required by the Governor, Senate or House of Representatives.”); N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 74 
(“Each branch of the legislature as well as the governor and council shall have authority to require 
the opinions of the justices of the supreme court upon important questions of law and upon 
solemn occasions.”).   
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simply issued advisory opinions upon request even absent explicit 
constitutional authorization.133  
It is therefore unlikely that a court would find Article IX, Section 
9 non-justiciable on the grounds that it had been textually committed 
to another branch. In fact, the State has already rejected that argument 
in a challenge to the legislature’s funding decisions based on a similar 
clause also found in Article IX, Section 2. In Leandro v. State,134 
plaintiffs challenged the adequacy of funding for the State’s K–12 
education system, alleging that it failed to satisfy Article IX, Section 
2’s command that “[t]he General Assembly shall provide . . . for a 
general and uniform system of free public schools, . . . wherein equal 
opportunities shall be provided for all students.”135 The State argued 
that the political question doctrine barred the court from proceeding.136 
The North Carolina Supreme Court declared that argument meritless, 
explaining “[i]t has long been understood that it is the duty of the 
courts to determine the meaning of the requirements of our 
Constitution.”137  
An argument that Article IX, Section 9 is textually committed to 
the legislature will likely meet the same fate. Two differences 
distinguish Section 2 from Section 9, and neither bears on whether the 
matter has been committed to another branch. First, Section 2 governs 
primary and secondary education,138 while Section 9 governs higher 
education.139 And second, Section 9 does qualify that higher education 
must be free “as far as practicable,”140 while Section 2 contains no such 
qualification.141 “As far as practicable” is language that must be 
interpreted, but as the North Carolina Supreme Court already 
explained, “it is the duty of the courts to determine the meaning of the 
requirements of our Constitution.”142 Because North Carolina courts 
play a significant role in giving meaning to the State’s constitution, and 
 
 133. Katherine White, Advisory Opinions: The “Ghosts That Slay,” in NORTH CAROLINA 
FOCUS, supra note 131, at 329. 
 134. Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249 (N.C. 1997).  
 135. Id. at 256. 
 136. Id. at 253–54. 
 137. Id. at 253. 
 138. See N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 2 (relating to the establishment for a “[u]niform system of 
schools”). 
 139. See id. art. IX, § 9 (relating to “[t]he University of North Carolina and other public 
institutions of higher education”). 
 140. Id.  
 141. See id. art. IX, § 2 (failing to include the “as far as practicable” qualification). 
 142. Leandro, 488 S.E.2d at 253. 
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have already asserted their authority to give meaning to clauses similar 
in substance and form to Section 9, a court should not find a question 
arising under the clause to be non-justiciable on the grounds that it has 
been textually committed to a coordinate branch. 
Second, as explained later in this Note, constitutional provisions 
imposed contemporaneously with Article IX, Section 9’s antecedent 
limited the General Assembly’s discretion.143 It is unlikely that the 
drafters would textually commit higher education funding to the 
legislature’s discretion while simultaneously limiting the General 
Assembly’s discretion about how to fund higher education. 
2. Judicially Discoverable and Manageable Standards. Another 
hurdle would be the charge that Article IX, Section 9 lacks judicially 
discoverable and manageable standards. That very argument 
convinced the Arizona Supreme Court that a challenge to higher 
education funding based on Arizona’s constitution was not viable.144  
While the Supreme Court has held that “a lack of judicially 
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving [a controversy]” 
makes it non-justiciable,145 the Court has not extensively elucidated 
what it means by “judicially discoverable and manageable standards.” 
It has suggested, though not held, that the inquiry is guided by the 
belief that the absence of such standards in a text is evidence that its 
drafters did not intend for judicial interference.146 In Vieth v. 
Jubelirer,147 a plurality suggested that sufficiently determinate language 
may be necessary.148 In that case, Justice Scalia, writing for himself and 
three other justices, dismissed a challenge to partisan gerrymandering, 
declaring that “‘[f]airness’ does not seem to us a judicially manageable 
 
 143. See infra notes 218–22 and accompanying text (explaining how Sections 5, 15, and 16 of 
Article IX of the North Carolina Constitution of 1868 impose additional constraints by, 
respectively, requiring the University be held as one with the public common schools, requiring 
the General Assembly to appropriate escheats to the University, and requiring the General 
Assembly to provide for agriculture and mechanical instruction at the University). 
 144. See Kromko v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 165 P.3d 168, 172 (Ariz. 2007) (“We can conceive 
of no judicially discoverable and manageable standards . . . by which we could decide such issues, 
either individually or in the aggregate.”). 
 145. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228 (1993). 
 146. Id. at 228–29 (“[T]he lack of judicially manageable standards may strengthen the 
conclusion that there is a textually demonstrable commitment to a coordinate branch.”). 
 147. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004).  
 148. See id. at 293 (explaining that “[s]ome criterion more solid and more demonstrably met” 
than “fairness” is “necessary . . . to meaningfully constrain the discretion of the courts, and to win 
public acceptance for the courts’ intrusion into a process that is the very foundation of democratic 
decisionmaking”). 
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standard.”149 For two reasons, this prong of the political question 
doctrine does not preclude suit here. 
First, the Supreme Court’s ruling in Zivotofsky v. Clinton,150 a case 
concerning the relative powers of Congress and the President in 
foreign relations decided after Kromko,151 calls into question the 
relevance of this prong of the political question doctrine in this case. 
Zivotofsky I explained that, at least in the federal context, concerns 
about a lack of judicially manageable standards “dissipate . . . when the 
issue is recognized to be the more focused one of the constitutionality 
of [a statute].”152 In analyzing the constitutionality of the statute at 
issue, the Court relied on historical evidence like the minutes of 
George Washington’s meetings with his cabinet, the Federalist Papers, 
and messages from Andrew Jackson to Congress.153 Similar historical 
evidence can be marshalled by a court analyzing the constitutionality 
of a statute appropriating funds to the State’s university in relation to 
Article IX, Section 9. 
Second, Zivotofsky I aside, an exploration of the history of Article 
IX, Section 9’s command reveals that the clause does, in fact, contain 
judicially discoverable and manageable standards. In the Kromko 
litigation, Arizona’s intermediate appellate court noted a lack of such 
historical evidence in relation to Title XI, § 6,154 suggesting it could 
have given meaning to the clause’s “as nearly free as possible” 
language if provided with evidence as to what the clause’s drafters 
intended. 
A case from Hawaii offers useful parallels. In Nelson v. Hawaiian 
Homes Commission,155 the Hawaii Supreme Court used historical 
evidence to find judicially manageable standards in the somewhat 
obscure language of a provision of the State’s constitution that 
required the legislature to appropriate “sufficient sums” to the 
 
 149. Id. at 291. 
 150. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189 (2012). 
 151. Id. at 196 (noting that the case “involves deciding whether the statute impermissibly 
intrudes upon Presidential powers under the Constitution”). 
 152. Id. at 197. 
 153. Id. at 197–201. 
 154. Kromko v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 146 P.3d 1016, 1020 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006) aff’d in part, 
vacated in part, 165 P.3d 168 (Ariz. 2007) (“[Article 11, Section 6 and Article 11, Section 10] 
provoked negligible attention during the adoption of the Arizona Constitution. There is no 
historical record of the intent of the framers beyond the words of the constitutional provisions.”). 
 155. Nelson v. Hawaiian Homes Comm’n, 277 P.3d 279 (Haw. 2012). 
MOORE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 10/27/2018  1:37 PM 
396  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 68:371 
Department of Hawaiian Home Lands (“DHHL”).156 There, the 
Hawaii Supreme Court rejected the State’s contention that the clause 
lacked judicially manageable standards and was therefore non-
justiciable, explaining that “the history of the times and the state of 
being when the constitutional provision was adopted”157 provided 
those standards. The history of DHHL’s role in Hawaii’s constitution 
mirrors that of the University of North Carolina. The department, 
which was tasked with distributing over 200,000 acres of land that the 
federal government had granted the State specifically for use by 
descendants of native Hawaiians, historically struggled to fund its 
operations.158 Hawaii’s first constitution established the agency, but left 
funding of it to the discretion of the legislature.159 The legislature barely 
funded the agency, leaving DHHL to lease some of the 200,000 acres 
it was granted in order to pay its operational costs.160 Leasing those 
lands, of course, meant there was less land for the agency to disperse.161  
The justices explored this history, seeking to understand the 
dilemma faced by the drafters of Hawaii’s 1978 Constitution.162 Their 
analysis includes numerous block quotes from debates of Hawaii’s first 
constitution, documents pertaining to the administration of DHHL 
prior to the 1978 Constitution, and in some instances unabridged 
debates from the drafting of the 1978 Constitution.163 The court began 
by acknowledging the relevance of “the history of the times and the 
state of being when the constitutional provision was adopted.”164 It 
then summarized the conundrum posed by DHHL’s lack of funding, 
writing: “In short, in 1978, it was apparent that DHHL was swept up in 
a vicious cycle: . . . in order to raise money for administrative and 
operating expenses, the department had to lease the vast majority of 
its lands that otherwise would have been used for homestead lots.”165 
 
 156. Id. at 291–92. 
 157. Id. at 292 (quoting State v. Kahlbaun, 638 P.2d 309, 315 (Haw. 1981)). 
 158. See infra note 165 and accompanying text.   
 159. Nelson, 277 P.3d at 292.  
 160. Id. at 283–84. 
 161. Id. at 284. 
 162. See id. at 292 (“In order to give effect to the intention of the framers and the people 
adopting a constitutional provision, an examination of the debates, proceedings and committee 
reports is useful.” (quoting Kahlbaun, 638 P.2d at 316)). 
 163. See id. at 292–97 (quoting in large portions Debates in the Committee of the Whole on 
Hawaiian Affairs Comm. Prop. No. 11, 1 Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of Hawaii 
of 1978 (“1 Proceedings”) (1980)). 
 164. Id. at 292 (quoting Kahlbaun, 638 P.2d at 315). 
 165. Id. at 294. 
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Next, the court analyzed the provision and its history in light of the 
specific problem the drafters were trying to solve.166 Before analyzing 
the record of a debate between two delegates about the meaning of 
“sufficient,” the court announced its understanding that “[t]he 
constitutional convention delegates focused on providing sufficient 
sums to DHHL for its administrative and operating expenses in 
particular.”167  
The court’s understanding that the drafters were attempting to 
draft a constitution that resolved a specific problem—insufficient 
funding for DHHL, which caused the agency to lease the very land it 
was tasked with dispersing—enabled it to bypass much of the fatal 
indeterminacy of funding provisions in constitutions. Hawaii argued 
that the court could not possibly determine an amount of funding 
“sufficient” to operate DHHL without first determining “how many 
lots, loans, and rehabilitation projects . . . DHHL must provide.”168 But 
the court responded that “[i]t is clear that the constitutional delegates 
intended to require appropriation of ‘sufficient sums’ to relieve DHHL 
of the burden of general leasing its lands to generate administrative 
and operating funds, and to that end, they identified the minimum 
funding necessary for such expenses.”169 With its understanding of the 
drafters’ intent in mandating a “sufficient sum,” for “administrative 
and operational costs,” the court needed only to mine the record of 
debate of the 1978 Constitution for what the drafters deemed 
“sufficient” to operate DHHL.170 It proved easy to discover, as three 
delegates to the 1978 constitutional convention discussed how DHHL 
needed from “$1.3 to $1.6 million” to operate.171  
The course charted by the Hawaii Supreme Court in Nelson can 
guide a court’s effort to find judicially discoverable and manageable 
standards in Article IX, Section 9 of North Carolina’s constitution. As 
the court in Nelson stated, constitutional provisions should be 
interpreted in light of “the history of the times and the state of being 
when the constitutional provision was adopted.”172 This historical 
inquiry should begin with the 1868 Constitution both because North 
 
 166. Id. at 295–97.  
 167. Id. at 295 (emphasis added).  
 168. Id. at 297. 
 169. Id.  
 170. Id. at 296. 
 171. Id.  
 172. Id. at 292 (quoting State v. Kahlbaun, 638 P.2d 309, 315 (Haw. 1981)). 
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Carolina’s present constitution, ratified in 1971, was not intended to 
change the substantive rights of citizens or obligations of the 
government contained in the State’s 1868 Constitution,173 and because 
the language in Article IX, Section 9 first appeared in the 1868 
Constitution.174 
Like DHHL, the University of North Carolina was established, 
but not guaranteed funding, by its State’s first constitution.175 The 
drafters of the 1868 Constitution recognized that legislative discretion 
in funding the University hindered an attempt to educate the people of 
the State,176 just as legislative discretion in Hawaii’s first constitution 
inhibited the agency’s efforts to disperse land to descendants of native 
Hawaiians.177 Most importantly, drafters of the 1868 Constitution took 
steps to remove from the legislature discretion to properly fund—or, 
not fund—the University.178 The Nelson court also looked to evidence 
of what amount the drafters would have understood as sufficient to 
operate the agency at the time of ratification.179 Similarly, a court in 
North Carolina could look to what tuition prices the drafters thought 
were as free as practicable when they redrafted the State’s constitution 
in 1971. With regard to Article IX, Section 9, historical evidence is an 
effective means of establishing judicially manageable standards. 
III. TEXTUAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF ARTICLE IX,  
SECTION 9 
That Article IX, Section 9 is justiciable says nothing about the 
legal obligation the clause imposes on the state legislature. This Part 
aims to elucidate the substance of that obligation. Because much of the 
 
 173. See supra Part I.C (explaining that the drafters of the 1971 Constitution did not intend 
changing any of the substantive rights guaranteed by the previous constitution). 
 174. See N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, § 6, in 5 THORPE, supra note 1, at 2817 (“The general 
assembly shall provide that the benefits of the university, as far as practicable, be extended to the 
youth of the State free of expense for tuition . . . .”). 
 175. See N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XLI, in 5 THORPE, supra note 1, at 2794 (declaring that the 
school will be established “with such salaries to the masters, paid by the public, as may enable 
them to instruct at low prices”). 
 176. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (explaining that the University maintained low 
academic standards to attract more students).  
 177. See supra notes 158–61 and accompanying text.  
 178. See supra Part I.B (detailing how provisions of the 1868 Constitution limited the 
legislature’s discretion to defund higher education). 
 179. See Nelson v. Hawaiian Homes Comm’n, 277 P.3d 279, 296 (Haw. 2012) (relying on 
evidence in the record regarding debate over the new constitution that DHHL required “$1.3 to 
$1.6 million” to operate). 
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clause’s meaning can be gleaned from its text alone, this Part begins 
with a textual analysis of Article IX, Section 9. However, to fully glean 
the clause’s meaning, the text alone is insufficient. Thus, this Part 
supplements textual analysis with an exploration of the intent of the 
drafters the clause’s antecedent in 1868 and the understanding of the 
clause’s meaning held by those who carried it over into the State’s 
present constitution. This analysis is supported by historical evidence 
of the drafters’ conception of the University and its affordability at the 
time they wrote the 1868 and 1971 Constitutions.  
A. The Text of Article IX, Section 9 
North Carolina courts begin any constitutional inquiry with an 
analysis of the plain meaning of the text.180 Here, the plain meaning of 
Article IX, Section 9 illuminates whom the clause binds, which 
universities are included in the promise, what benefits are to be 
provided, and what expense is to be free, as far as practicable. 
Unfortunately, the text alone cannot give meaning to “as far as 
practicable.” Article IX, Section 9 reads: “The General Assembly shall 
provide that the benefits of The University of North Carolina and other 
public institutions of higher education, as far as practicable, be 
extended to the people of the State free of expense.”181 The word 
“shall,” makes the language imperative upon the General Assembly, 
as “the ordinary meaning of ‘shall’ is ‘must.’”182 That is, the command 
to ensure higher education remains accessible is plainly addressed to 
the General Assembly. Thus, it is the legislature who is ultimately 
responsible for ensuring tuition at the State’s public universities 
remains affordable. Quite simply, the General Assembly cannot escape 
Article IX, Section 9’s mandate. 
A less obvious point is that the “benefits” of the University refer 
to the educational instruction it offers. The clause’s predecessor in the 
1868 Constitution was clearer on this point because it linked the 
“benefits” with “tuition,” reading that the benefits must be offered, “as 
far as practicable, free of expense of tuition.”183 That linking is key. 
Because the benefits are to be offered without their expense, qualifying 
 
 180. Town of Boone v. State, 794 S.E.2d 710, 715 (N.C. 2016) (“We look to the plain meaning 
of the [constitutional] phrase to ascertain its intent.”).  
 181. N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 9. 
 182. Cook v. FDA, 733 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2013); see also Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss 
Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 35 (1998) (noting that “the mandatory ‘shall’” “normally 
creates an obligation impervious to judicial discretion” (citation omitted)). 
 183. N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, § 6, in 5 THORPE, supra note 1, at 2817 (emphasis added). 
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expense with tuition also helps to define the benefits. Tuition is defined 
as “[t]he action or business of teaching a pupil or pupils.”184 
Accordingly, the 1868 Constitution makes plain that it is the 
educational instruction that the General Assembly is to subsidize. 
The present incarnation omits the word “tuition”185—an omission 
the drafters neglected to explain.186 However, because the drafters of 
the 1971 Constitution emphasized their intent not to substantively 
change the obligations of North Carolina’s constitution,187 the most 
logical interpretation of the present clause is that the “benefits” it 
refers to remain educational instruction. By extension, the expense that 
must be free, as far as practicable, is the expense of instruction. Or, as 
the 1868 Constitution described it, “tuition.”188 That revelation is 
responsive to those who argue that the cost of college has risen because 
of an increase in fees associated with room, board, and facilities like 
student centers or gyms. Those commentators have a point; the 
addition of new—and the increase of existing—fees is, arguably, 
responsible for at least some of the increase in the real cost of 
attendance.189 That proposition is contested; others suggest that cost of 
attendance has risen as a result of tuition increases sparked by a 
reduction in state support for public universities.190 Regardless, fees 
cannot explain why tuition has risen, as the two are separate 
expenses.191 
The benefits must come from “[t]he University of North Carolina 
and other public institutions of higher education.”192 The latter half of 
the phrase is redundant because, importantly, all sixteen of the State’s 
public universities constitute The University of North Carolina.193 The 
 
 184. Tuition, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989). 
 185. N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 9. 
 186. CONSTITUTION STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 39, at 86–88 (discussing the provision 
without explaining the omission). 
 187. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
 188. N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, § 6, in 5 THORPE, supra note 1, at 2817.  
 189. See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Selingo, The Hidden Cost of College: Rising Student Fees, WASH. POST 
(Aug. 24, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2017/08/24/the-hidden-
cost-of-college-rising-student-fees/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.af015277a6dc [https://perma.cc/
SAL8-8VLM] (explaining that increased student fees and increased costs in room and board are 
responsible for the increased costs of higher education). 
 190. Webber, supra note 27. 
 191. See UNIV. OF N.C. AT CHAPEL HILL, TUITION & FEES ACADEMIC YEAR 2017-2018, 
supra note 24 (listing “tuition” and “fees” separately and combining the two to produce a “total”). 
 192. N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 9. 
 193. 220 Years of History, supra note 21. 
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“other public institutions of higher education” language is the product 
of a historical anachronism. At the time of the 1971 Constitution’s 
drafting, the State’s public universities operated separately.194 The 
drafters were merely attempting to recognize that, since the drafting of 
the 1868 Constitution, the State had established additional public 
universities.195 A year after the adoption of the present constitution, 
the legislature placed all of the public universities within one 
“University of North Carolina,”196 rendering language about other 
public universities redundant.  
“[P]eople of the state,” refers to the citizens of North Carolina. 
For this text of the clause alone, extensive statutory language exists. 
The legislature requires one not only to have been domiciled in the 
State for twelve or more months, but also to have been domiciled “for 
purposes of maintaining a bona fide domicile rather than of 
maintaining a mere temporary residence or abode incident to 
enrollment in an institution of higher education.”197 
Finally, “as far as practicable.” The definition of “practicable”—
“able to be done or put into practice successfully”198—is far from 
clarifying. And looking elsewhere in the constitution’s text is hardly 
helpful. The phrase does appear one other place, in Article III, Section 
11 where the legislature is directed to, no later than 1975, have grouped 
“all administrative departments, agencies, and offices of the State,” 
into “principal administrative departments so as to group them as far 
as practicable according to major purposes.”199 The drafters made no 
attempt to explain the meaning of this clause in their commentary.200 
Nor is the text of the clause’s historical antecedent in the 1868 
Constitution illuminating. While the phrase “as far as practicable,” and 
similar iterations like “as soon as practicable,” appear multiple times 
 
 194. See id. (“In 1971 legislation was passed bringing into the University of North Carolina 
the state’s ten remaining public senior institutions, each of which had until then been legally 
separate . . . .”). 
 195. See supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
 196. The North Carolina Constitution was presented to voters and approved in 1970. Orth, 
supra note 34, at 1760. The universities were combined into one system in 1971. 220 Years of 
History, supra note 21.  
 197. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 116-143.1(c) (2014). 
 198. Practicable, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed.1989). 
 199. N.C. CONST. art. III, § 11 (emphasis added). 
 200. See CONSTITUTION STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 39, at 77–78 (omitting discussion of 
the clause in the discussion of Article III). 
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in the record of debates at the constitutional convention, the drafters 
declined to explain its meaning.201  
While there is little that can be gleaned about the clause’s meaning 
from its use in those instances, this analysis does reveal that the 
language was not understood to detract from the forcefulness of the 
command to the legislature. For example, the convention passed a 
resolution calling for North Carolina to be reunited with the federal 
government—the paramount concern for Reconstructionist 
governments in the South—“at the earliest day practicable.”202 
Elsewhere, the convention passed a resolution calling for a committee 
report on the establishment of a government in North Carolina to be 
submitted “as soon as practicable.”203 The entire convention lasted only 
from January 14, 1868 to March 17, 1868.204 Thus, “as soon as 
practicable” was not understood to allow for some delay. Yet the 
phrase did not just relate to temporal urgency. In adopting the rules of 
procedure for the convention, it was resolved that the “Rules of Order 
of the Convention of this State for 1865–66 . . . be adopted . . . so far as 
practicable.”205 There is no subsequent mention of the substitution of 
another code of procedure because those rules of orders were 
impracticable.  
Language similar to “as far as practicable” was even used in 
relation to higher education. Article IX, Section 16 requires that “[a]s 
soon as practicable after the adoption of this constitution the general 
assembly shall establish and maintain, in connection with the 
university, a department of agriculture, of mechanics, of mining and of 
normal instruction.”206 Here, the General Assembly did not view the 
“as soon as practicable” language as detracting from the mandate—it 
conditioned reopening the University in 1875 on developing a program 
in agriculture and mechanics.207 
 
 201. See generally JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF 
NORTH-CAROLINA (1868) [hereinafter JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION] 
(demonstrating that the phrases came up in multiple iterations during the debates).  
 202. Id. at 32–33. 
 203. Id. at 30–31. 
 204. Id. at 4, 481. 
 205. Id. at 12. 
 206. N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, § 16, in 5 THORPE, supra note 1, at 2818. 
 207. As William D. Snider’s historical account of the University of North Carolina explains:  
After prolonged study the trustees saw their only hope in persuading the General 
Assembly to revalidate the agricultural and mechanical college Land Scrip Fund, 
obtained by Governor Swain from the federal government in 1867 under the Morrill 
Act. [Due to the Board of Trustees having lost that money in a bond scandal, t]he state 
remained responsible to the federal government for restoring the principal, but in a 
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While textual analysis of “as far as practicable” illuminates the 
drafters’ intent to require the founders to provide adequate funding for 
higher education, we must look elsewhere to discover what the 
founders deemed adequate. 
B. Original Meaning 
The same historical evidence that provided judicially manageable 
standards also lends support to the conclusion that a tuition of roughly 
$1450 is as free as practicable. Historical evidence is often used to give 
meaning to constitutional text.208 This is particularly true where the 
intent of the drafters can clarify a clause’s meaning.209 For example, in 
Heller v. District of Columbia,210 the Supreme Court employed 
historical context to give meaning to the grammatical ambiguity in the 
text of the Second Amendment.211 And, in Nelson, the Hawaii Supreme 
Court not only relied on historical evidence to find a challenge to the 
adequacy of funding of the Hawaiian Homes Commission justiciable, 
but also to arrive at a precise dollar amount the legislature was 
required to appropriate.212  
When expounding upon the meaning of its constitution, North 
Carolina courts must “interpret the organic law in accordance with the 
intent of its framers and the citizens who adopted it.”213 Because of the 
similar constitutional histories of DHHL and the University of North 
Carolina,214 to resolve the meaning of “as far as practicable,” a court 
examining the North Carolina Constitution should, like the Nelson 
 
closely contested fight the General Assembly authorized the state to pay an annual sum 
of $7500 to the university as interest on the money, provided the university offered 
agricultural and mechanical instruction. 
SNIDER, supra note 12, at 89–90 (emphasis added). 
 208. Emil A. Kleinhaus, Note, History as Precedent: The Post-Originalist Problem in 
Constitutional Law, 110 YALE L.J. 121, 121 (2000). 
 209. See id. at 122 (“In order to elucidate the original meaning of the vague terms that pervade 
the Constitution, Justices often either delve into primary sources or rely on historians to explain 
those sources.”).  
 210. Heller v. District of Columbia, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 211. See Kerr v. Hickenlooper, 744 F.3d 1156, 1178 (10th Cir. 2014) (“There is no evidence 
that the Court in Heller even considered the possibility that the [historical] sources available to it 
could be insufficient for developing judicially discoverable and manageable standards.”), vacated 
and remanded on other grounds, 135 S. Ct. 2927 (2015). 
 212. Nelson v. Hawaiian Homes Comm’n, 277 P.3d 279, 297 (Haw. 2012). 
 213. Sneed v. Greensboro City Bd. of Educ., 264 S.E.2d 106, 110 (N.C. 1980). 
 214. See supra Part II.B.2 (explaining the parallel histories of DHHL and UNC. Both were 
established in their state’s first constitution but failed to receive adequate funding in the years 
following the ratification of those constitutions. Only after subsequent constitutions required the 
legislature to provide financial support did both flourish financially). 
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court, look to the history of the problem that the drafters were 
attempting to resolve. In Nelson, the court understood that the drafters 
were attempting to prevent the legislature from severely underfunding 
DHHL so as to cause the agency to have to lease some of its land to 
cover its operating costs.215 This understanding informed the court’s 
examination of the historical record as a standard for “sufficient sum,” 
namely, whatever the operating costs were for DHHL.216 Similarly, 
when the drafters of North Carolina’s 1868 Constitution wrote that 
higher education should be as free as practicable, they were seeking to 
alleviate the crippling financial burden the University was saddled with 
after the legislature took from it the proceeds of the State’s escheats.217 
Thus, a court need only look for evidence of what the drafters of the 
1868 Constitution thought would be necessary to ensure the legislature 
could not underfund the university.  
As in Nelson, there is little difficulty in finding that evidence in the 
historical record surrounding the Education section of North 
Carolina’s constitution. While the Nelson court had to mine convention 
debates to find a standard, the drafters of North Carolina’s 1868 
Constitution put the standards in its text. Because the drafters chose to 
remove from the legislature’s powers even the ability to reclaim the 
escheats by granting the escheats to the University in the 
constitution,218 it seems safe to assume that one source of funding they 
thought necessary to ensure the University’s fiscal health was the very 
escheats the legislature had first appropriated to the University in 1789 
before attempting to retake them. So essential to the University were 
escheats, the drafters believed, that they reversed the legislature’s 
actions and preserved the reversal in Article IX, Section 15.219  
Moreover, in Article IX, Section 16, the drafters required the 
legislature to work with the University to provide “agricultural and 
 
 215. Nelson, 277 P.3d at 294–95. 
 216. Id. at 297. 
 217. See supra Part I.B (explaining how the drafters of the 1868 Constitution imposed limits 
on the legislature’s discretion with regard to funding as a response to the years of underfunding).  
 218. N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, § 15, in 5 THORPE, supra note 1, at 2818. 
 219. In 1800, the legislature passed a measure removing escheats as a source of funding for 
the University, but the North Carolina Supreme Court invalidated that law. See CONSTITUTION 
STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 39, at 138 (noting that the North Carolina Supreme Court 
invalidated the legislature’s attempt to repeal the escheats statute of 1789 “on the ground that it 
constituted a taking of vested property other than by the law of the land, in violation of the 
constitution”). The 1868 Constitution required escheats to be awarded to the University, denying 
the legislature the opportunity to take back the escheats by statute as it tried to do in 1800. N.C. 
CONST. of 1868, art. IX, § 15, in 5 THORPE, supra note 1, at 2818.  
MOORE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 10/27/2018  1:37 PM 
2018] PRACTICABLE AND JUSTICIABLE 405 
mechanical education”220—an implicit command that the legislature 
work to ensure eligibility for Morrill Act land grants.221 Thus, funds 
from the proceeds of lands granted to the State through the Morrill Act 
were also thought to be required to make tuition as free as possible. 
And, in Section 5, the drafters declared that the University was to be 
“held to an inseparable connection with the free public-school system 
of the State,”222 evincing a commitment by the State to ensure that 
higher education was similarly, if not precisely, as affordable as the free 
K–12 system. Thus, “as free as practicable” encompassed efforts to 
ensure the University’s accessibility approached that of the free public-
school system. 
Unlike in Nelson, the recorded debates of the drafting of North 
Carolina’s 1868 Constitution do not specify an amount the drafters 
thought was appropriate for tuition.223 However, the actions taken by 
the drafters led to a substantial decrease in tuition, down to $60224 from 
$80225 when the University reopened in 1875. Tuition remained at 
$60—with brief exception in the 1880s—until 1924.226  
Had no developments in North Carolina’s constitutional history 
occurred since the 1868 Constitution, this evidence might not be 
sufficient to find judicially discoverable standards. The price of tuition 
in response to the 1868 Constitution is persuasive evidence of the price 
the drafters envisioned, but not nearly as dispositive as drafters 
specifying a requisite amount in debates, as was the case in Nelson. But 
the citizens of North Carolina reaffirmed that commitment by ratifying 
the constitution of 1971, which did not “impair any present right of the 
individual citizen” nor “bring about any fundamental change in the 
power of state . . . government or the distribution of that power.”227 At 
the time the constitution was being redrafted and ratified, tuition prices 
 
 220. Id. art. IX, § 16, in 5 THORPE, supra note 1, at 2818. 
 221. See supra notes 75–77 and accompanying text.  
 222. N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, § 5, in 5 THORPE, supra note 1, at 2817. 
 223. Compare Nelson v. Hawaiian Homes Comm’n, 277 P.3d 279, 296 (Haw. 2012) (quoting 
a delegate to Hawaii’s constitutional convention as saying DHHL needed “$1.3 to $1.6 million” 
to operate), with JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 201 (lacking a 
reference to dollar amount that would suffice a tuition that is free, as far as practicable). 
 224. UNIV. OF N.C., CATALOGUE OF THE TRUSTEES, FACULTY AND STUDENTS OF THE 
UNIV. OF N.C. 1869-’70, at 15 (1870). 
 225. UNIV. OF N.C., CATALOGUE OF THE TRUSTEES, FACULTY AND STUDENTS OF THE 
UNIV. OF N.C., 1875-’76, at 13 (1876). 
 226. See UNIV. OF N.C., THE CATALOGUE 1923-24, at 61 (1924) (showing a tuition in 1924 of 
$20 per quarter, for a total of $80 per year). 
 227. CONSTITUTION STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 39, at 10. 
MOORE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 10/27/2018  1:37 PM 
406  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 68:371 
were, adjusted for inflation, remarkably similar to prices when the 
University first reopened under the 1868 Constitution. Moreover, in 
the century that had passed since North Carolina ratified the 1868 
Constitution, tuition prices had, adjusted for inflation, remained 
remarkably stable.228 
Article IX, Section 9 in the 1971 Constitution should be viewed as 
constitutionalizing this stable tuition price—around $1450 in 2017 
dollars—for three reasons.229  
First, though the record is sparse, it is likely that the drafters of the 
1971 Constitution were aware of the tuition prices of the day. It is 
evident that they were generally aware of the state of public higher 
education in North Carolina, as they made technical corrections to the 
wording of some provisions, including to Article IX, Section 9, to 
account for changes that had occurred since the 1868 Constitution.230 
Many of the drafters attended the University,231 so they must have been 
aware of the low cost of tuition, at least when they attended. North 
Carolina courts have recognized that some background knowledge 
may be imputed to lawmakers,232 and should impute to the drafters a 
general understanding of the state of higher education. 
Second, the drafters constitutionalized other contemporary 
practices in higher education. Their treatment of escheats is illustrative. 
One of the few changes the drafters of the 1971 Constitution did make 
to the Education section of the constitution was to the escheats 
provision. Instead of committing the escheats to the University to use 
for any purpose, as the 1868 Constitution had done, the drafters 
 
 228. See supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text.  
 229. An amount of $60 in 1875 would be worth $1,337.02 in 2017, adjusted for inflation as 
calculated and discussed in supra note 4. 
 230. See CONSTITUTION STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 39, at 88 (“Proposed Sec. 8 extends 
present Sec. 6 (which deals only with the University [of North Carolina at Chapel Hill]) to take 
account of the duty of the State to maintain institutions of higher education in addition to the 
University of North Carolina [at Chapel Hill].”). 
 231. For just a couple of examples, Chairman of the Drafting Committee Emery B. Denny 
attended UNC Law School. N.C. SUP. CT. HIST. SOC., EMERY B. DENNY, 
https://ncschs.net/justices-portraits/denny-emery-b [https://perma.cc/R36M-8A6L] (last visited 
Sept. 1, 2018). Vice Chairman Archie Davis attended UNC Chapel Hill. See Scott Huler, The Man 
and Plan Behind Research Triangle Park, OUR STATE (Aug. 25, 2014), 
https://www.ourstate.com/research-triangle-park [https://perma.cc/J6ZR-PGGY].  
 232. See Kornegay Family Farms LLC v. Cross Creek Seed, Inc., 803 S.E.2d 377, 382 (N.C. 
2017) (“[T]he legislature is always presumed to act with full knowledge of prior and existing 
law . . . .” (quoting Polaroid Corp. v. Offerman, 507 S.E.2d 284, 294 (N.C. 1998))). 
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required that proceeds from the interest of the State’s escheats be used 
to provide scholarships for low-income students in the State.233 
In their notes, drafters explain that this change was actually just a 
preservation of the status quo.234 As explained above, in 1946 UNC-
Chapel Hill felt its state funding was sufficient to allow the University 
to cease drawing from the principle of the escheats.235 Moreover, 
because of generous state funding through regular appropriations, the 
Board of Trustees no longer felt the need to use escheats to cover 
operational costs and instead began using escheats exclusively to fund 
scholarships for low-income students.236  
The drafters’ treatment of escheats only makes sense if one 
accepts that they viewed the tuition prices of the day as satisfying 
Article IX, Section 9’s language. In 1868, granting the University 
escheats to use as a means of covering operational costs was the 
primary way that the drafters ensured that the General Assembly 
fulfilled its obligation to ensure that higher education was “as far as 
practicable, free of expense.”237 If the drafters of the 1971 Constitution 
did not believe that the State was meeting the obligation to ensure that 
higher education remained affordable by funding higher education 
through other avenues, then it would make little sense for them to have 
precluded the universities from using the escheats to cover operational 
costs, keeping tuition prices low for everyone. Viewed this way, North 
Carolina’s century-long experience with low and stable tuition prices is 
analogous to, if not a one-for-one substitution for, the record of 
DHHL’s operation costs included in debates during the drafting of 
Hawaii’s 1978 Constitution. Just as the Nelson court identified those 
records as a judicially discoverable standard,238 a court in North 
Carolina could identify the low and stable tuition prices with which the 
drafters of the 1971 Constitution were familiar as a judicially 
discoverable standard contained within Article IX, Section 9.  
 
 233. See N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 10(2) (“All property . . . from escheats, unclaimed dividends, 
or distributive shares of the estate of deceased persons shall be used to aid worthy and needy 
students who are residents of the State and are enrolled in public institutions of higher education 
in this State.”). 
 234. CONSTITUTION STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 39, at 138–39 (noting that Amendment 
No. 10 to the 1971 constitution preserves the practice of distributing escheats among “needy 
North Carolina residents” with modifications to accommodate the expanding university system).  
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. 
 237. See supra Part I.B.  
 238. Nelson v. Hawaiian Homes Comm’n, 277 P.3d 279, 297 (Haw. 2012). 
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IV. POSSIBLE REMEDIES REQUIRED BY AN ARTICLE IX, SECTION 9 
CHALLENGE 
While the focus of this Note was to discern the meaning of Article 
IX, Section 9, the clause’s meaning is of little value if the rights it grants 
cannot be vindicated. There exist three possible remedies that courts 
may grant in the event of a suit by students. The first, judicial 
imposition of roughly $1450 as the cost of tuition at state universities, 
is the one that most logically follows from the above analysis, but may 
prove to be most problematic. The second remedy, a remand to the 
General Assembly to appropriate sufficient funds, is one that most 
states’ courts—including those of North Carolina—have been most 
comfortable imposing in education funding cases, but which often 
results in decades of litigation producing few results. The third and 
final remedy would involve the court requiring the legislature to 
consider certain relevant data about the cost of higher education, 
drawing inspiration from the Wyoming Supreme Court’s response to 
the failures of the remand described above.  
A. Inflation-Adjusted Pricing 
Article IX, Section 9’s command that higher education be “as far 
as practical, free of expense,”239 represents the constitutionalization of 
a particular price for tuition at the State’s universities, namely around 
$1450 per year when adjusted for inflation.240 The most logical remedy, 
therefore, would be for a court to mandate that the legislature set the 
price of tuition at $1450 and allow it to be increased only in response 
to inflation.  
Mechanically, a judicial mandate of educational funding would 
not be difficult to accomplish. While the legislature has generally 
delegated responsibility for setting the cost of tuition at the State’s 
universities to the UNC Board of Governors,241 it has set tuition prices 
at some of the State’s universities by statute.242 Nothing would prevent 
the legislature from amending the statutes to require tuition be set at 
$1450 if so mandated by a court. However, because this remedy does 
not necessarily require the legislature to actually provide funding 
necessary to lower tuition, it could do little to lower the cost of 
 
 239. N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 9. 
 240. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 241. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 116-143(a) (2014). 
 242. See id. § 116-143.11(a) (setting tuition at Elizabeth City State University, the University 
of North Carolina at Pembroke, and Western Carolina University at $500 per semester).  
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attendance at the State’s public universities. The legislature could pass 
a statute setting tuition at $1450 but appropriate no additional funds, 
leaving universities with a significant revenue gap.  
Most likely, making up the gap becomes an exercise in relabeling 
costs. In addition to tuition, which is addressed by the State’s 
constitution, colleges charge fees, which were not mentioned by Article 
IX, Section 9’s antecedent in the 1868 Constitution.243 These fees relate 
to everything from room, board, and library usage to recreational 
facilities and athletics.244 Fees could easily be increased to offset the lost 
revenue. In fact, some argue that the somewhat recent explosion in fees 
charged by colleges is an attempt to do just that.245  
This would be antithetical to the purpose of Article IX, Section 9 
and the intent of the drafters of the clause’s historical antecedent in the 
Constitution of 1868. As explained above, the clause was meant to 
ensure that the expenses associated with educational instruction were 
subsidized by the State.246 The State cannot satisfy its constitutional 
mandate merely by relabeling the costs it assigns to students.  
When the drafters of North Carolina’s 1868 Constitution first 
declared that the State must offer higher education as free as 
practicable, they took steps to ensure that the General Assembly kept 
tuition low by robustly funding the University.247 The same must be 
true of any court’s attempt to ensure that the legislature is satisfying 
the constitutional mandate today.  
A court could itself determine an acceptable amount and order 
the General Assembly to pay it, but that outcome is almost impossible 
to imagine. North Carolina’s Supreme Court has explained that 
“appellate courts have tempered language about broad inherent power 
endemic to the status of the judiciary as a co-equal branch of 
government with self-restraint regarding the reach into the public 
fisc.”248 Other courts, faced with a similar question in regard to the 
 
 243. N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, § 6, in 5 THORPE, supra note 1, at 2817. 
 244. See STUDENT FEES, UNIV. OF N.C. AT CHAPEL HILL, https://cashier.unc.edu/tuition-
fees/student-fees [https://perma.cc/YFM3-DVM4] (last visited Nov. 23, 2017) (listing, among 
others, fees for athletics, student organizations, the student endowed library fund, and campus 
recreation). 
 245. Selingo, supra note 189. 
 246. See supra Part I.B.  
 247. Id. 
 248. In re Alamance Cty. Court Facilities, 405 S.E.2d 125, 132 (N.C. 1991).  
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adequacy of funding for K–12 education have refused to order a 
specific dollar amount in deference to separation of powers.249  
B. “Remand” to the General Assembly 
Another potential remedy is for a court to direct the General 
Assembly to pass new legislation regarding higher education funding 
after considering the meaning given to Article IX, Section 9 by the 
court. This remedy is common in challenges to the adequacy of K–12 
education funding under a state constitution.250 Unfortunately, most 
often this remedy results in years’ worth of litigation, as cases ping-
pong between the legislature, trial courts, and the state supreme 
court.251  
North Carolina’s Leandro v. State, a challenge to the adequacy of 
the State’s funding of public K–12 education that first began in 1996,252 
is emblematic of this approach and its flaws. In that case, students from 
poor, rural school districts in the northeastern corner of the State 
alleged that funding for K–12 education was insufficient to “meet the 
minimal standard for a constitutionally adequate education.”253 
Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that, due to a lack of funding, they had 
“inadequate school facilities”; “sparse and outdated book collections” 
and technology; difficulty “compet[ing] for high quality teachers”; 
unwieldy class sizes; and low test scores.254 The plaintiffs argued that 
these conditions showed that the State was failing its constitutional 
 
 249. See Gannon v. State, 402 P.3d 513, 552 (Kan. 2017) (“Consistent with our practice in this 
case, we decline to provide a specific minimal amount to reach constitutional adequacy.”).  
 250. See, e.g., id. at 553 (declining “to provide a specific minimal amount [of funding] to reach 
constitutional adequacy” and directing the legislature to conduct further evaluation); Hoke Cty. 
Bd. of Educ. v. State, 599 S.E.2d 365, 393 (N.C. 2004) (noting that “when the State fails to live up 
to its constitutional duties, a court is empowered to order the deficiency remedied” and, if the 
government fails to do so, “impos[e] a specific remedy and instruct[]the recalcitrant actors to 
implement it”); Abbeville Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 780 S.E.2d 609, 610 (S.C. 2015) (mem.) 
(ordering the legislature to “[w]ithin one week of the conclusion of the 2016 legislative session . . . 
submit a written summary to the Court detailing their efforts to implement a constitutionally 
compliant education system, including all proposed, pending, or enacted legislation”). 
 251. See, e.g., Gannon, 402 P.3d at 517–18 (noting that the opinion was the fifth in a series of 
school finance decisions that involved “[a] series of other panel decisions, legislative enactments, 
and four [Kansas Supreme Court] decisions”); Hoke Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. State, No. 95CVS1158, 
2000 WL 1639686, at *1 (N.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 12, 2000), aff’d in part as modified and rev’d in part, 
358 N.C. 605 (N.C. 2004) (noting that the case had originated six years prior in 1994); Abbeville 
Cty. Sch. Dist., 780 S.E.2d at 609–10 (listing the procedural history of the case involving state 
governor and legislature). 
 252. Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 251–52 (N.C. 1997). 
 253. Id. at 252.  
 254. Id.  
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duty to provide “for a general and uniform system of free public 
schools . . . wherein equal opportunities shall be provided for all 
students.”255 The court agreed, holding that the State’s constitution 
required the General Assembly to provide students a “sound basic 
education,” which the court defined by listing the skills such an 
education would impart to students.256  
Though the North Carolina Supreme Court ultimately remanded 
the case to the trial court, it stated its belief that the legislature, with 
some guidance, was best positioned to remedy the failure.257 In that 
vein, the court wrote “the legislative process provides a better forum 
than the courts for discussing and determining what educational 
programs and resources are most likely to ensure that each child of the 
state receives a sound basic education.”258 The trial court took the 
North Carolina Supreme Court’s hint, directing the legislature to craft 
legislation remedying any deficiencies it identified and retaining 
jurisdiction of the case until it was satisfied by the legislature’s 
response.259 For example, after finding that students in low-income 
areas were entering kindergarten less prepared than their counterparts 
in wealthier school districts, the court directed the legislature to design 
and fund a system of early childhood education for certain low-income 
counties.260  
The problem with this approach is that it inevitably results in 
remarkably lengthy litigation. In fact, as recently as 2013, more than 
seventeen years after the initial suit was filed in Leandro, the North 
Carolina Supreme Court was hearing arguments about the sufficiency 
of the early childhood education system the legislature had created 
after the trial court’s directive in 2000.261 And while North Carolina’s 
litigation led to some concrete results, including the creation of a 
statewide early childhood education system,262 other states have 
 
 255. Id. at 254 (quoting N.C. CONST. art IX, § 2(1)).  
 256. Id. at 255. 
 257. Id. at 259. 
 258. Id.  
 259. Hoke Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. State, No. 95CVS1158, 2000 WL 1639686, at *11, *113 (N.C. 
Super. Ct. Oct. 12, 2000), aff’d in part as modified and rev’d in part, 599 S.E.2d 365 (N.C. 2004). 
 260. Id. at *112–14.  
 261. See Brief for Appellee at 2–4, Hoke County Bd. of Educ. v. State, 752 S.E.2d 501 (N.C. 
2013) (No. 5PA12-2) (summarizing the procedural history and demonstrating that the litigation 
remains ongoing).  
 262. See Christina Samuels, N.C. Supreme Court to Decide on Pre-K Funding, EDUC. WEEK 
(Oct. 29, 2013), https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2013/10/30/10preschool.h33.html [https://
perma.cc/48YS-222D] (noting the 2001 launching of More At Four, a “state-funded preschool 
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experienced similarly lengthy litigation without the results. Since the 
case’s filing in 2010, the Kansas Supreme Court has issued six opinions 
in Gannon v. State,263 a state constitutional challenge to the legislature’s 
funding of K–12 education, with its most recent opinions being handed 
down in October 2017 and June 2018.264 Each time, it has found the 
legislature to have failed to satisfy its commands.265 As recently as 2015, 
South Carolina was still holding proceedings related to Abbeville 
County School District v. State,266 a 1999 challenge to the adequacy of 
funding for K–12 education under the state constitution.267  
Regardless of whether the litigation has been effective, it appears 
state courts nationwide are growing weary.268 In an expansive survey of 
litigation challenging the adequacy of funding for K–12 education, 
Julia Simon-Kerr and Robynn Sturm list examples from, among other 
states, South Carolina, Massachusetts, and Texas where courts that 
once eagerly engaged with adequacy litigation now appear to be 
 
program” that “became one of the best-regarded state-funded preschool programs in the 
country”). 
 263. Gannon v. State, 402 P.3d 513 (Kan. 2017). 
 264. See  id. at 517 (“This is the fifth school finance decision involving these parties and Article 
6 of the Kansas Constitution, which imposes a duty on the legislature to ‘make suitable provision 
for finance of the educational interests of the state.’” (citation omitted)); Gannon v. State, 420 
P.3d 477, 480 (Kan. 2018) (noting that Gannon stayed the issuance of the mandate to “g[i]ve the 
State ample time to . . . [bring] the K–12 public education financing system into constitutional 
compliance”). 
 265. Gannon, 402 P.3d at 521–23.  
 266. Abbeville Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 780 S.E.2d 609 (S.C. 2015).  
 267. See id. at 610–11 (reviewing the legislature’s plan for complying with the South Carolina 
Constitution’s education mandate and retaining jurisdiction over the matter to review that plan). 
 268. Julia A. Simon-Kerr and Robynn K. Sturm aptly summarize this trend, explaining:  
A close reading of recent opinions reveals three primary ways in which the changing 
education landscape has heightened separation of powers concerns for courts 
adjudicating second-generation cases. First, courts are troubled by the increasingly 
intrusive remedial role seemingly demanded in order to improve school systems that 
have already undergone significant reforms. This failure to perceive an acceptable 
remedial role can lead courts to abdicate their function entirely in adequacy 
adjudication, essentially, if not overtly, reversing any positive precedent. Second, signs 
of renewed political engagement and progress (however minimal) may cause courts to 
question the very legitimacy of judicial intervention. Over the years, a powerful strain 
of argument has developed maintaining that the judiciary should only engage in 
structural reform litigation in the face of egregious political neglect. In courts that 
subscribe to this view, plaintiffs will struggle to convince judges that anything more 
than perfunctory oversight on their part is constitutionally permitted, let alone 
necessary, when the legislature is also actively involved. Finally, improved schools 
further blur the already uncertain line delineating breach. Where ambiguous 
constitutional standards and steadily improving conditions pose tricky line-drawing 
problems, courts are much more likely to defer to the judgment of the legislature. 
Simon-Kerr & Sturm, supra note 115, at 97–98. 
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seeking an exit.269 Because these remedies have resulted in prolonged 
litigation, Simon-Kerr and Sturm have advocated abandoning them 
altogether.270  
C. Procedural Remedies 
A third potential remedy would have the court act not through 
directives to the legislature, but rather as a backstop to it. This method 
would ensure compliance with the state constitution by examining 
whether the legislature undertook constitutionally relevant 
considerations in appropriating funds to the university system. The 
Supreme Court has employed this technique in determining whether 
Congress abrogated state sovereign immunity. For example, in Board 
of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett,271 the Supreme 
Court held that Congress had improperly abrogated state sovereign 
immunity in Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act because, 
though it made findings that “historically, society has tended to isolate 
and segregate individuals with disabilities,”272 it failed to make the 
necessary finding that state action historically caused the isolation and 
segregation.273 
The Wyoming Supreme Court employed a similar technique after 
becoming frustrated with the ineffectiveness of its initial directive to 
the State legislature in a K–12 funding case.274 Rather than issue 
another directive its elected representatives might ignore, the court 
opted to search the record of debate of school funding legislation for 
evidence that elected officials had considered relevant factors.275  
The Wyoming court’s approach to adjudicating the adequacy of 
funding for at-risk students is illustrative. Previously, the court had 
ruled that the State’s funding for at-risk students was insufficient and 
“not based upon actual costs of the necessary programs” and directed 
 
 269. Id. at 121 (recommending that education advocates challenging the adequacy of funding 
“must find a way to recharacterize both the right and the remedy so that they cannot be boiled 
down to a demand for increased funding”). 
 270. Id. at 121–23. The authors recommend moving beyond remedies involving money, 
highlighting a South Carolina case where the trial judge ordered the creation of a statewide 
preschool program and a Wyoming case where the court looked at the factors considered by the 
court in developing a funding formula for schools with large “at-risk” student populations. Id.  
 271. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001). 
 272. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2) (2012). 
 273. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368–69. 
 274. Simon-Kerr & Sturm, supra note 115, at 122 n.184.  
 275. Id.  
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the State to provide more funds.276 Yet the issue returned to 
Wyoming’s highest court when a suit was filed alleging that the 
legislature had failed to heed the court’s directive. The justices declined 
to again attempt to determine if the funding was sufficient.277 Instead, 
they asked if, since the court’s last decision, the State had improved its 
process for determining funding for at-risk students.278  
First, the court described the State’s old method, which used 
participation in free or reduced cost lunch programs as a proxy for at-
risk status and thus based funding off of that number alone.279 Next, the 
court described how the State had engaged a consultant to craft a 
better mechanism for determining at-risk status.280 Under the new 
method, the State looked not at participation in the free or reduced 
lunch program, but in eligibility for it, recognizing that some parents 
might elect not to have their children participate, but that the parent’s 
election not to participate did not preclude the student from being “at-
risk.”281 Moreover, the State considered additional factors that might 
make one “at-risk,” like English Language Proficiency and whether 
one has frequently changed schools.282 This inquiry satisfied the court, 
which deemed the State’s plan constitutional, writing “[t]here is little 
question that the state exerted significant effort to develop a fair and 
accurate method of estimating the additional cost of addressing at-risk 
students.”283  
This framework tracks the least with the intent of the drafters of 
Article IX, Section 9 and its historical antecedent. As explained above, 
the drafters of the 1971 Constitution had in mind a particular price they 
had identified as satisfying Article IX, Section 9’s mandate that higher 
education in the State be as free as practicable.284 By contrast, this 
remedy would merely ask if the legislature had considered factors 
relevant to affordability in appropriating funds.  
 
 276. Campbell Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 181 P.3d 43, 57–58 (Wyo. 2008).  
 277. See id. at 59 (affirming lower court’s finding that the legislature responded property to 
the court’s directive even though its funding calculation does not capture “all of the possible at-
risk students or all of the possible costs necessary to address their particular problems” because 
“[t]here are too many variables involved in the at-risk issue to expect precision in estimating the 
costs of educating these students”).  
 278. Id. at 58–59. 
 279. Id. at 58. 
 280. Id.  
 281. Id. at 58–59.  
 282. Id.  
 283. Id. at 59. 
 284. See supra notes 229–38 and accompanying text. 
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It also raises separation of powers issues. The North Carolina 
Supreme Court has explained that the legislature is better equipped to 
make decisions regarding education funding because its members are 
“popularly elected,” and “it can hear and consider the views of the 
general public as well as educational experts.”285 At the same time, “the 
judicial branch has its duty under the North Carolina Constitution” and 
must “issue . . . relief as needed to correct [a constitutional] wrong.”286 
Still, this remedy has its advantages. For one thing, it is conscious 
of the complexity of funding education in the twenty-first century. 
Those complexities are extensive in higher education, even if one 
focuses only on tuition. Some courses of study are more expensive than 
others.287 The market for faculty at doctoral or master’s degree-
granting universities may involve higher salaries.288 By policing the 
process of appropriating funds to ensure affordability is considered, a 
court need not worry that the tuition price it mandates is unworkably 
low at some universities, while a windfall for others. This was not a 
problem faced by the drafters of the 1868 Constitution, who knew of 
only one state-supported university.  
Moreover, speaking realistically, North Carolina’s legislature 
could benefit from outside policing of how it appropriates funds. The 
legislature is part-time.289 Legislators are paid around $14,000 in base 
pay a year, meaning most are occupied by another full-time job.290 It is 
not difficult to imagine that North Carolina’s legislators lack sufficient 
indicia of affordability in a way analogous to how the Wyoming 
Legislature lacked sufficient indicia of what constituted an “at-risk” 
student.  
 
 285. Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 259 (N.C. 1997). 
 286. Id. at 261.  
 287. Scott Jaschik, Study Finds Variation in Costs by Different Majors, INSIDE HIGHER ED 
(Jan. 9, 2017), https://www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2017/01/09/study-finds-variation-
costs-different-majors [https://perma.cc/J42B-97GX]. 
 288. AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS, VISUALIZING CHANGE: THE 
ANNUAL REPORT ON THE ECONOMIC STATUS OF THE PROFESSION, 2016-17, at 14 (2017), 
https://www.aaup.org/file/FCS_2016-17.pdf [https://perma.cc/M66H-8WFV] (reporting average 
salaries for professors at doctorate granting institutions in 2016-17 was $132,741, while average 
pay for professors at Master’s and Baccalaureate granting institutions was $94,950 and $90,368 
respectively). 
 289. Patrick Gannon, Here’s What NC Legislators Took Home in State Pay in 2015, NEWS & 
OBSERVER (Feb. 27, 2016, 7:18 PM), http://www.newsobserver.com/news/politics-
government/state-politics/article62863302.html [https://perma.cc/NTY7-YFG9]. 
 290. Id.  
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CONCLUSION 
In 1776, the drafters of North Carolina’s constitution promised its 
citizens an unparalleled public university. Ninety years later, the 
drafters of North Carolina’s 1868 constitution strengthened that 
promise by guaranteeing that higher education would be accessible to 
all, a promise backed up by provisions requiring the General Assembly 
to supply financial support necessary to ensure the University was 
affordable. In 1971, as the fruits of that promise cemented the State’s 
legacy as a leader of the American South, it reaffirmed that guarantee 
once more. Today, the UNC System has blossomed to include sixteen 
universities, and UNC-Chapel Hill stands as the nation’s oldest public 
institution of higher education. But the financial vagaries of the Great 
Recession tested the State’s commitment to that promise and, while 
college tuition remains lower in North Carolina than many states, some 
early evidence suggests North Carolina is beginning to falter on its 
constitutional obligation. Article IX, Section 9 requires the General 
Assembly to provide to the State’s citizens higher education at a cost 
of no more than $1450 per year, adjusted for inflation. Should the 
General Assembly fail to adhere to this constitutional imperative, 
citizens should turn to the State’s courts to vindicate their rights. And, 
in those courts, they should prevail. 
 
